(십자성호를 그으며)
† 성부와 성자와 성령의 이름으로 아멘.
질문:
방치(放置)는 무엇을 말하며, 방치의 결과로서 발생하는 바에는 어떤 것들이 있는지요?
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당부의 말씀:
많이 부족한 죄인인 필자의 글들은 어떤 특정인의 감정을 자극하기 위하여 마련된 글들이 결코 아니기에, 다음의 당부의 말씀을 드립니다:
(1) 지금까지 필자의 글들을 읽고서 필자에 대한 "분노(anger)" 혹은 "질투(envy)"를 가지게 된 분들은, 혹시라도 그분들께 "걸림돌(stumbling block)"일 수도 있는, 많이 부족한 죄인의 글들을 더 이상 읽지 마시기 바랍니다. 꼭 부탁드립니다.
(2) 그리고 위의 제(1)항의 당부의 말씀을 읽고도 굳이 이 화면의 아래로 스스로 이동하여, 많이 부족한 죄인의 아래의 본글을 읽는 분들은, 필자에 대한 "분노(anger)"와 "질투(envy)" 둘 다를 가지지 않을 것임에 동의함을 필자와 다른 분들께 이미 밝힌 것으로 이해하겠습니다.
(3) 그리 길지 않은 인생 여정에 있어, 누구에게나, 결국에, "유유상종[類類相從, 같은 무리끼리 서로 사귐 (출처: 표준국어대사전)]"이 유의미할 것이라는 생각에 드리는 당부의 말씀입니다.
답변:
+ 찬미 예수님!
1.
다음은 Modern Catholic Dictionary에 주어진 "negligence(放置, 방치)" 라는 용어에 대한 설명입니다:
출처: http://www.therealpresence.org/dictionary/n/n060.htm
(발췌 시작)
NEGLIGENCE
The conscious omission of a duty, implying mental inertia rather than malice of will. Yet it becomes morally culpable at the moment a person is even dimly aware of what he or she is doing and of the evil results that may follow. Church law distinguishes slight, ordinary, or gross negligence, and imputability differs accordingly.
방치(放置, negligence)
어떤 의부에 대한 의식적인 태만을 말하는데, 이 태만은 의지에 기인하는 악의(malice of will)라기 보다는 심리적 굼뜸(inertia)를 의미합니다. 그럼에도 불구하고 이것은, 한 인격이 그가 행하고 있는 바애 대하여 그리고 뒤따를 수도 있는 악한(evil) 결과들에 대하여 심지어 어렴풋이 알아차리는 바로 그 순간에 윤리적으로 과실이 있게(morally culpable) 됩니다. 교회법은 경미한(slight), 통상적(common), 혹은 총체적(gross) 방치를 구분하며, 그리하여 책임지울 수 있음(imputability)는 그 정도에 따라 다릅니다.
(이상, 발췌 및 우리말 번역 끝).
게시자 주:
(1) 따라서 무엇이든지 계속하여 방치(放置, negligence)하게 되면,
그곳에는 결국에 "악화가 양화를 구축하게[Bad money drives out good. (그레샴의 법칙)] 되고,"
그리하여 그 결과 그곳에는 결국에 "황폐화(devastation)" 및 "황량화(desolation, 거주자들과 방문자들의 결여)"가 뒤따를 것입니다.
(2) 그런데, 위의 제1항의 설명은 너무 간단하다는 생각입니다.
(이상, 게시자 주 끝).
2.
다음은 영어 가톨릭 대사전에 주어진 "negligence"에 대한 설명입니다:
출처: http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/10737b.htm
(발췌 시작)
Negligence
방치(放置, negligence)
(Latin nec, not, and legere, to pick out).
The condition of not heeding. More specifically it is here considered as the omission, whether habitual or not, of the care required for the performance of duties, or at any rate, for their full adequate discharge. In the teaching of St. Thomas, it is rated not only as a characteristic discernible in the commission of all sins, but also as a special sin in itself. Its particular deformity he judges to be the imputable lack of satisfying such solicitude as is here and now demanded for the satisfying of obligations. He therefore assigns prudence as the virtue to which it is directly opposed. What has been said applies also to actions which are not of precept, once it is resolved to undertake them. Negligence, according to St. Thomas, is initially at least a lack of promptness of will, and is quite distinguishable from torpor or slipshodness in execution. It is not commonly esteemed to be more than a venial sin. There are, however, two notable exceptions to this statement:
주의를 기울이지 않음(not heeding)이라는 상태를 말합니다. 더 구체적으로 이것은 여기서, 습관적이거나 혹은 그렇지 않거나 간에, 의무들의 수행을 위하여, 혹은 아무튼, 의무들의 충분한 적합한 수행을 위하여, 요구되는 보살핌에 있어서의 태만(omission)으로 간주됩니다. 성 토마스 아퀴나스(St. Thomas Aquinas)의 가르침에 있어, 이것은 모든 죄들의 범함에 있어 식별할 수 있는 한 개의 특성으로서 뿐만이 아니라, 또한 그 자체로 한 개의 고유한(special) 죄로서 순위가 매겨집니다.(*) 그가 판단하는 이 죄의 특별한 추함(particular deformity)은, 의무(duties)들에 기인하는 만족을 주는 행위를 위하여 여기서 그리고 지금 요구되는 바처럼 바로 그러한 세심한 돌봄과 보호의 상태(solicitude)와 같은, 만족을 주는 행위에 있어서의, 책임지울 수 있는(imputable), 결여(lack)에 있습니다. 그러므로 그는 이 죄에 직접적으로 반대되는 덕(virtue)으로서 [사추덕들 중의 한 개의 윤리덕인] 현명(prudence)을 할당합니다. 이미 말해진 바는 또한, 이전에 의무들을 떠맡기 위하여 결의된, 규범(precept)에 기인하지 않는 행위들에 적용됩니다. 성 토마스 아퀴나스에 따르면, 방치는 초기에 적어도 의지의 신속성(promptness)에 있어서의 어떤 결여이며, 그리하여 수행에 있어 무기력(torpor) 혹은 아무렇게나 함(slipshodness)으로부터 상당히 구별될 수 있습니다. 이 죄는 한 개의 소죄(a venial sin)보다 더한 것으로서 통상적으로 평가되지 않습니다. 그러나 바로 이 서술문에 대하여 두 개의 주목할 만한 예외들이 다음과 같이 있습니다:
if a person is careless to the point of omitting something which is indispensable for salvation (de necessitate salutaris) or
만약에 한 인격이 구원에 필수불가결한(de necessitate salutaris) 그 무엇을 태만히 함의 정도에까지 부주의하거나 혹은
if the remissness of will be so great as totally to extinguish the love of God in the soul, then the sin commited is obviously grievous.
의지의 부주의함(the remissness)이 영혼 안에 있는 하느님의 사랑을 전적으로 잃게 할 정도로 너무도 커다면, 범해진 이 죄는 분명하게 무겁습니다.
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(*) 번역자 주: 아래의 제3항을 읽도록 하라.
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Negligence is a factor to be reckoned with in determining the liability of one who has damaged another in any way. In the court of conscience the perpetrator of damage can only be held responsible and bound to restitution when his action has been attended with moral culpability, i.e. has been done freely and advertently. The civil law exacts the exercise of diligence whose measure is established according to the different subject matter involved. The absence of this degree of care on the part of an agent is assumed by the civil law to be culpable, and is punished with the penalties provided. Thus the common law generally distinguishes three classes of negligence as follows: gross negligence is the failure to employ even the smallest amount of care, such as any person, no matter how heedless, would use for the safeguarding of his own interests; ordinary negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care, such as a person of ordinary capacity and capable of governing a family would take of his own affairs; slight negligence is the failure to bring to bear a high degree of care, such as very thoughtful persons would maintain in looking after their own interests. The civil law may and does impose the obligation of reparation for harm wrought not only where ordinary and gross negligence are shown, but also at times when only slight negligence holds good likewise in conscience, once the decision of the judge decreeing it has been rendered.
방치(放置, negligence)는 어떤 방식으로 다른 이에게 이미 손해를 입힌 자의 책임 있음(liability)을 결정함에 있어 열거되어야 하는 한 개의 요인입니다. 양심 법정(the court of conscience)에 있어 손해의 가해자는 그의 행위가 윤리적 과실 있음(moral culpability)과 함께, 즉 자유롭게 그리고 주의 깊게, 이미 수행되었을 때에만 오로지 책임이 있다고 판결되고 그리고 손해 배상(restitution)이 의무지워 집니다. 민법(the civil law)은 개입된 서로 다른 대상(subject matter)에 따라 그 척도가 설정되는 주의(diligence)의 행사를 강제적으로 요구합니다(exacts). 한 행위자(an agent) 측에 있어 보살핌에 있어서의 바로 이러한 정도의 부재는 민법에 의하여 죄가 있다고 추정되며, 그리하여 마련된 형벌들로써 벌을 받게 됩니다. 따라서 관습법(the common law)은 일반적으로 방치에 있어서의 세 가지 부류들을 다음과 같이 구분합니다: 총체적 방치(gross negligence)는 어떤 인격이, 얼마나 부주의한지에 무관하게, 자신 고유의 이익들에 대한 보호 행위를 위하여 사용할 수도 있는(would) 것처럼, 보살핌에 있어서의 심지어 가장 적은 양을 쓰는 것에 대한 실패(failure)를 말하고, 그리고 통상적 방치(ordinary negligence)는, 통상의 능력을 지닌 그리고 한 가족을 다스리는 능력이 있는 한 인격이 자신 고유의 사안들에 대하여 취할 수도 있는(would) 것처럼, 통상의 보살핌을 행사하는 것에 대한 실패를 말하며, 그리고 경미한 방치(slight negligence)는, 매우 사려깊은 인격들이 자신들 고유의 이익들을 돌봄에 있어 지속할 수도 있는(would) 것처럼, 보살핌에 있어서의 어떤 높은 정도의 의무를 지는 것에 대한 실패를 말합니다. 민법은, 통상의 및 총체적 방치가 나타내어진 곳에서 뿐만이 아니라, 또한 때로는, 양심에 있어 마찬가지로, 과거에 그것을 판결하는 재판관의 결정이 이미 언도되었다면, 오로지 경미한 방치가 계속할 때에(hold good), 가해진 해악(harm wrought)에 대한 보상(補傷, reparation)의 의무를 부과할 수도 그리고 정말로 부과합니다.
(이상, 발췌 및 우리말 번역 끝).
3.
다음은 "신학대전여행" IIa IIae, q54 방치 및 성 토마스 아퀴나스(St. Thomas Aquinas)의 "신학 대전(Summa Theologica)" IIa IIae, q54 방치 전문입니다:
54. Negligence
54. 방치(放置)
1. Negligence is a lack of due care, a culpable absence of solicitude, in meeting or performing the practical duties of life.
1. 방치(放置, negligence)는, 삶에 있어서의 실천적 의무들을 만나거나 혹은 수행함에 있어, 당연한(due) 보살핌의 어떤 결여, 세심한 돌봄과 보호의 상태(solicitude)(*)의 어떤 과실 있는 부재를 말합니다.
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(*) 번역자 주: "solicitude"를 "세심한 돌봄과 보호의 상태"로 번역한 것은 다음의 Merriam-Webster Dictionary에 주어진 설명을 따른 것이다:
http://www.merriam-webster.com/wdictionary/solicitude
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2. Solicitude or proper carefulness is allied to prudence. Hence, a sin against solicitude is a sin against prudence.
2. 세심한 돌봄과 보호의 상태(solicitude) 혹은 적절한 돌봄의 상태(proper carefulness)는 현명(prudence)(*)과 동류입니다(is allied to). 따라서, 세심한 돌봄과 보호의 상태에 반하는 어떤 죄는 현명에 반하는 어떤 죄입니다.
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(*) 번역자 주: "현명(prudence)"은, 다음에 있는, 지혜서 8,7이 그 성경 근거인, 네 개의 주된 윤리덕(the four cardinal virtues)들, 즉 "사추덕"들 중의 하나이다:
http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1427.htm
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3. Although negligence is often a venial sin, it is possible that it may be a mortal sin; this is the case on two occasions: (a) when negligence is concerned with something necessary to salvation, and (b) when negligence is a complete remissness about the things of God.
3. 비록 방치(放置)가 자주 어떤 소죄(a venial sin)이기는 하나, 그것이 어떤 대죄(a mortal sin)일 수도 있음은 가능하며, 그리고 이것은 다음과 같은 두 가지 경우들에 있어 그러합니다: (a) 방치(放置)가 구원(salvation)에 필수적인 그 무엇과 관련되어 있을 때, 그리고 (b) 방치(放置)가 하느님의 일(the things of God)들에 관하여 어떤 완전한 부주의함(remissness)일 때.
====================
출처 1: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3054.htm
출처 2: http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ENG0023/__P93.HTM
신학 대전 IIa IIae
Question 54. Negligence
We must now consider negligence, under which head there are three points of inquiry:
이제 우리는 방치(放置, negligence)에 대하여 고찰하여야 하며, 이 표제 아래에서 질문에 있어서의 세 개의 요지들이 다음과 같이 있습니다:
1. Is negligence a special sin?
2. To which virtue is it opposed?
3. Is negligence a mortal sin?
Article 1. Whether negligence is a special sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not a special sin. For negligence is opposed to diligence. But diligence is required in every virtue. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Objection 2. Further, that which is common to every sin is not a special sin. Now negligence is common to every sin, because he who sins neglects that which withdraws him from sin, and he who perseveres in sin neglects to be contrite for his sin. Therefore negligence is not a special sin.
Objection 3. Further, every special sin had a determinate matter. But negligence seems to have no determinate matter: since it is neither about evil or indifferent things (for no man is accused of negligence if he omit them), nor about good things, for if these be done negligently, they are no longer good. Therefore it seems that negligence is not a special vice.
On the contrary, Sins committed through negligence, are distinguished from those which are committed through contempt.
I answer that, Negligence denotes lack of due solicitude. Now every lack of a due act is sinful: wherefore it is evident that negligence is a sin, and that it must needs have the character of a special sin according as solicitude is the act of a special virtue. For certain sins are special through being about a special matter, as lust is about sexual matters, while some vices are special on account of their having a special kind of act which extends to all kinds of matter, and such are all vices affecting an act of reason, since every act of reason extends to any kind of moral matter. Since then solicitude is a special act of reason, as stated above (Question 47, Article 09), it follows that negligence, which denotes lack of solicitude, is a special sin.
Reply to Objection 1. Diligence seems to be the same as solicitude, because the more we love [diligimus] a thing the more solicitous are we about it. Hence diligence, no less than solicitude, is required for every virtue, in so far as due acts of reason are requisite for every virtue.
Reply to Objection 2. In every sin there must needs be a defect affecting an act of reason, for instance a defect in counsel or the like. Hence just as precipitation is a special sin on account of a special act of reason which is omitted, namely counsel, although it may be found in any kind of sin; so negligence is a special sin on account of the lack of a special act of reason, namely solicitude, although it is found more or less in all sins.
Reply to Objection 3. Properly speaking the matter of negligence is a good that one ought to do, not that it is a good when it is done negligently, but because on account of negligence it incurs a lack of goodness, whether a due act be entirely omitted through lack of solicitude, or some due circumstance be omitted.
Article 2. Whether negligence is opposed to prudence?
Objection 1. It would seem that negligence is not opposed to prudence. For negligence seems to be the same as idleness or laziness, which belongs to sloth, according to Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 45). Now sloth is not opposed to prudence, but to charity, as stated above (Question 35, Article 3). Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Objection 2. Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence. But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.
Objection 3. Further, imprudence relates to some act of reason. But negligence does not imply a defect of counsel, for that is "precipitation," nor a defect of judgment, since that is "thoughtlessness," nor a defect of command, because that is "inconstancy." Therefore negligence does not pertain to imprudence.
Objection 4. Further, it is written (Ecclesiastes 7:19): "He that feareth God, neglecteth nothing." But every sin is excluded by the opposite virtue. Therefore negligence is opposed to fear rather than to prudence.
On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 20:7): "A babbler and a fool [imprudens] will regard no time." Now this is due to negligence. Therefore negligence is opposed to prudence.
I answer that, Negligence is directly opposed to solicitude. Now solicitude pertains to the reason, and rectitude of solicitude to prudence. Hence, on the other hand, negligence pertains to imprudence. This appears from its very name, because, as Isidore observes (Etym. x) "a negligent man is one who fails to choose [nec eligens]": and the right choice of the means belongs to prudence. Therefore negligence pertains to imprudence.
Reply to Objection 1. Negligence is a defect in the internal act, to which choice also belongs: whereas idleness and laziness denote slowness of execution, yet so that idleness denotes slowness in setting about the execution, while laziness denotes remissness in the execution itself. Hence it is becoming that laziness should arise from sloth, which is "an oppressive sorrow," i.e. hindering, the mind from action [Cf. 35, 1; I-II, 35, 8].
Reply to Objection 2. Omission regards the external act, for it consists in failing to perform an act which is due. Hence it is opposed to justice, and is an effect of negligence, even as the execution of a just deed is the effect of right reason.
Reply to Objection 3. Negligence regards the act of command, which solicitude also regards. Yet the negligent man fails in regard to this act otherwise than the inconstant man: for the inconstant man fails in commanding, being hindered as it were, by something, whereas the negligent man fails through lack of a prompt will.
Reply to Objection 4. The fear of God helps us to avoid all sins, because according to Proverbs 15:27, "by the fear of the Lord everyone declineth from evil." Hence fear makes us avoid negligence, yet not as though negligence were directly opposed to fear, but because fear incites man to acts of reason. Wherefore also it has been stated above (I-II, 44, 2) when we were treating of the passions, that "fear makes us take counsel."
Article 3. Whether negligence can be a mortal sin?
Objection 1. It would seem that negligence cannot be a mortal sin. For a gloss of Gregory [Moral. ix. 34 on Job 9:28, "I feared all my works," etc.] says that "too little love of God aggravates the former," viz. negligence. But wherever there is mortal sin, the love of God is done away with altogether. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Objection 2. Further, a gloss on Sirach 7:34, "For thy negligences purify thyself with a few," says: "Though the offering be small it cleanses the negligences of many sins." Now this would not be, if negligence were a mortal sin. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
Objection 3. Further, under the law certain sacrifices were prescribed for mortal sins, as appears from the book of Leviticus. Yet no sacrifice was prescribed for negligence. Therefore negligence is not a mortal sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 19:16): "He that neglecteth his own life [Vulgate: 'way'] shall die."
I answer that, As stated above (2, ad 3), negligence arises out of a certain remissness of the will, the result being a lack of solicitude on the part of the reason in commanding what it should command, or as it should command. Accordingly negligence may happen to be a mortal sin in two ways. First on the part of that which is omitted through negligence. If this be either an act or a circumstance necessary for salvation, it will be a mortal sin. Secondly on the part of the cause: for if the will be so remiss about Divine things, as to fall away altogether from the charity of God, such negligence is a mortal sin, and this is the case chiefly when negligence is due to contempt.
But if negligence consists in the omission of an act or circumstance that is not necessary for salvation, it is not a mortal but a venial sin, provided the negligence arise, not from contempt, but from some lack of fervor, to which venial sin is an occasional obstacle.
Reply to Objection 1. Man may be said to love God less in two ways. First through lack of the fervor of charity, and this causes the negligence that is a venial sin: secondly through lack of charity itself, in which sense we say that a man loves God less when he loves Him with a merely natural love; and this causes the negligence that is a mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 2. According to the same authority (gloss), a small offering made with a humble mind and out of pure love, cleanses man not only from venial but also from mortal sin.
Reply to Objection 3. When negligence consists in the omission of that which is necessary for salvation, it is drawn to the other more manifest genus of sin. Because those sins that consist of inward actions, are more hidden, wherefore no special sacrifices were prescribed for them in the Law, since the offering of sacrifices was a kind of public confession of sin, whereas hidden sins should not be confessed in public.
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작성자: 교수 소순태 마태오 (Ph.D.)
작업에 소요된 시간: 약5시간
