가톨릭 신앙생활 Q&A 코너
|
Ia q2 하느님께서 존재하심 < 하느님의 속성들 < 신학 대전 여행 [신학대전여행] |
|---|
|
2011-06-08 ㅣ No.1061 2. The Existence of God
2. 하느님께서 존재하심
1. It is sometimes said that the truth of God's existence is self-evident, and hence neither needs a proof nor admits one. Now, a truth may be self-evident in two ways: (a) in itself and to the human mind; or (b) in itself, but not to the human mind. If you know the meaning of the words circle and roundness, you need no proof for the statement, "A circle is round." Indeed, no proof is possible, for a proof is to make a thing more evident, and nothing can make this statement more evident than the words in which it is expressed. Knowing what a circle is, you know that roundness belongs to it; when you say "circle" you are already saying "round." Here, then, is a truth that is self-evident both in itself and also self-evident to your mind. But if you did not clearly know the meaning of the words circle and roundness, the statement, "A circle is round" would not be self-evident to your mind, although it would still be, in itself, a self-evident truth. Now, the truth of the statement "God exists" is self-evident in itself; for God is necessarily existent; existence is as truly identified with God as roundness is identified with a circle. If the ideas God and existence, with their implications, were as quickly and perfectly available to the human mind as are the ideas circle and roundness, we should not need, and could not have, a reasoned proof for the existence of God. But, as a fact, we have not this prompt and perfect knowledge of God and existence. Thus, while the truth that God exists is self-evident in itself, it is not self-evident to the human mind. For man, this truth needs to be evidenced or proved.
1. 하느님께서 존재하신다는 진리(the truth of God's existence)(*)는 자명하며(self-evident), 그리하여 그 결과 어떤 증명(proof)을 필요로 하지도 않고 그리고 한 개의 증명도 허락하지 않는다고 때로는 말해집니다. 그런데, 어떤 진리는 다음과 같은 두 가지 방식들로 자명할 것입니다: (a) 본질적으로 그리고 인간의 마음에 있음, 그리고 혹은 (b) 본질적으로, 그러나 인간의 마음에 있지 아니함. 그대가 원(circle)과 둥긂(roundness)이라는 단어들의 의미를 알고 있다면, 그대는 "원은 둥글다(A circle is round)" 라는 문장을 위한 어떠한 증명도 필요로 하지 않습니다. 정말로, 어떠한 증명도 가능하지 않는데, 이는 한 개의 증명이란 어떤 것을 더욱 더 분명하게 하는 것이며, 그리고 어떠한 것도, 그 안에서 이 문장이 표현된, 이 단어들보다도 이러한 문장을 더 자명하게 할 수 없기 때문입니다. 원이 무엇인가를 알기에, 그대는 둥긂이 이것에 속함을 알고 있으며, 그리고 그대가 "원(circle)"을 말할 때에 그대는 "둥근 것(round)"을 이미 말하고 있습니다. 그 결과, 여기에, 본질적으로 그리고 그대의 마음에 또한 자명한, 둘 다로 자명한 진리가 있습니다. 그러나 만약에 그대가 원과 둥긂이라는 단어들의 의미를 분명하게 알지 못하였다면, "원은 둥글다" 라 함은, 비록 이것이 여전히, 본질적으로, 자명한 진리임에도 불구하고, 그대의 마음에 자명하지 아니 하였을 것입니다. 이제, "하느님께서 존재하신다" 라는 문장의 진리는 본질적으로 자명한데, 이는 하느님께서는 필연적으로 존재하시며, 그리고 존재(existence)는, 둥긂이 한 개의 원과 동일시 되는 것과 마찬가지로, 하느님과 진실로 동일시 되기 때문입니다. 만약에 하느님과 존재라는 개념(ideas)들이, 원과 둥긂이라는 개념들이 그러한 것과 마찬가지로, 그들의 함의(含意, implications)들과 함께, 인간의 마음에 재빨리 그리고 완미하게(perfectly) 입수될 수(available) 있다고 하면, 우리는 하느님께서 존재하심을 위한 한 개의 추론된 증명(a reasoned proof)도 필요로 하지 않아야 하며, 그리고 그러한 증명을 가질 수도 없을 것입니다. 그러나, 사실로서, 우리는 하느님과 존재에 대한 이러한 즉각적이고 완미한 앎(perfect knowledge)을 가지지 못합니다. 그러므로, 비록 하느님께서 존재하신다는 진리가 본질적으로 자명하기는 하나, 이것은 인간의 마음에 자명한 것이 아닙니다. 사람을 위하여, 이러한 진리는 입증되거나 혹은 증명되어야 할 필요가 있습니다.
2. Can we prove that God exists? Yes, we can. We can reason out this truth. There are two ways of reasoning a thing out. First, we may so perfectly know a cause that we can reason out what its effect must be; this is a priori reasoning. Secondly, we may know an effect better than we know its cause, and by studying the effect we can work back to know the cause that produced it; this is a posteriori reasoning. In proving the existence of God we use a posteriori reasoning.
2. 하느님께서 존재하심을 우리가 증명할 수 있을까요? 예, 우리는 할 수 있습니다. 우리는 이 진리를 추론해 낼(reason out) 수 있습니다. 어떤 것을 추론해 내는 데에는 두 가지 방식들이 있습니다. 첫 번째로, 우리가 너무도 완미하게(perfectly) 원인을 알고 있어 그리하여 우리는 그 결과가 무엇이어야만 함을 추론해 낼 수 있는데, 이것은 연역적 추론(a priori reasoning)입니다. 두 번째로, 우리는 우리가 그 원인을 아는 것보다 더 낫게 어떤 결과를 알 수 있을 것이며, 그리고 그 결과를 연구함으로써 우리는 그것을 산출하였던 원인을 알기 위하여 되돌아가 일을 할 수 있는데, 이것은 귀납적 추론(a posteriori reasoning)입니다. 하느님께서 존재하심을 증명함에 있어, 우리는 귀납적 추론을 사용합니다.
-----
3. There are five notable ways of reasoning out the truth that God exists. The first way is by considering motion in the world. Where there is motion, there is a mover, and ultimately a first mover, itself unmoved. This is God. The second way is by considering the chains of effecting causes that exist in the world. Things here are produced by their causes; these causes in turn were produced by their causes, and so on. Ultimately, there must be a first cause which is itself uncaused. This is God. The third way is by considering the contingency of things in the world. Contingent things do not have to exist; they are non-necessary; they come into existence, and undergo change, and pass away. Now, contingent things demand as their ultimate explanation a non-contingent being, a necessary being. This is God. The fourth way is by considering the scale of perfection manifest in the world. Things are more or less good, more or less noble, and so on. Now, where there is good and better and still better, there must at last be a best which is the source and measure of goodness all along the line. And where there is noble and nobler and still more noble, there must ultimately be a noblest which is the standard by which all lesser degrees of nobleness can be known and given their rating. In a word, where there are degrees of perfection, there must ultimately be absolute perfection. This is God. The fifth way is by considering the order and government seen in this world. Things act in a definite way and were manifestly designed to act so; through their nature (that is, their active or operating essence) they are governed in their activities. Thus there are design and government in the world. Hence there are ultimately a first designer and first governor. And since both design and government involve intelligence, there must be governor and designer who is the first and absolute intelligence. This is God.
3. 하느님께서 존재하신다는 진리를 추론해 내는 데에는 다섯 가지 주목할 만한 방식들이 있습니다. 그 첫 번째 방식은 이 세상에 있는 움직임(motion)을 생각함으로써 입니다. 움직임이 있는 곳에는, 한 개의 움직이게 하는 자(a mover), 그리하여 궁극적으로, 그 자신은 움직이지 않는, 한 개의 첫 번째로 움직이게 하는 자가 있습니다. 이것이 바로 하느님이십니다. 두 번째 방식은 이 세상에 존재하는 영향을 끼치는 원인(causes)들로 이루어진 일련(a chain)을 생각함으로써 입니다. 여기서 사물(things)들은 그들의 원인들에 의하여 산출되며, 그리고 이들 원인들은 차례로 그들의 원인들에 의하여 산출되었으며, 그리고 등등. 궁극적으로, 스스로 원인없이 존재하는(uncaused), 한 개의 첫 번째 원인(a first cause)이 존재하여야만 합니다. 이것이 바로 하느님이십니다. 세 번째 방식은 이 세상에 있는 사물(things)들의 [변성(變成)함에 있어 연(緣)의] 비필연성(非必然性)(contingency)을 생각함으로써 입니다. [변성(變成)함에 있어 연(緣)이] 비필연적인(非必然的) 사물들은 반드시 존재하여야 할 필요가 없는데(do not have to exist), 이는 그들이 [변성(變成)함에 있어 연(緣)이] 비필연적(非必然的)이기 때문이며, 이는 그들이 존재(existence)로 왔다가, 그리고 사라지기 때문입니다. 이제, [변성(變成)함에 있어 연(緣)이] 비필연적인(非必然的) 사물들은 그들에 대한 궁극적 설명으로서, 한 개의 필연적(必然的) 있음인(a necessary being), 한 개의 [변성(變成)함(becoming)에 있어 연(緣)이] 비필연적이지 아니한(즉, 필연적) 있음(a non-contingent being)을 요구합니다. 이것이 바로 하느님이십니다. 네 번째 방식은 이 세상에서 분명하게 보여지게 되는 완미(完美)의 등급(the scale of perfection)(**)를 생각함으로써 입니다. 사물들은 어느 정도(more or less) 선하고, 어느 정도 고귀하며, 그리고 등등입니다. 이제, 선한 것 그리고 더 나은 것 그리고 여전히 더 나은 것이 있는 곳에는, 모든 단계들에 있어 선함(goodness)의 원천이며 척도인 가장 선한 것 한 개가 결국에 존재하여야만 합니다. 그리고 고귀한 것 그리고 더 고귀한 것 그리고 여전히 더 고귀한 것이 있는 곳에는, 그것에 의하여 고귀함의 정도들이 덜한 모든 것들이 알게 될 수 있으며 그리고 그들에 대한 등급이 매겨질 수 있는 바로 그 기준(the standard)인, 가장 고귀한 것 한 개가 궁극적으로 존재하여야만 합니다. 한 마디로, 완미(完美)의 정도(degrees of perfection)들이 있는 곳에는, 절대적 완미(完美)(absolute perfection)가 궁극적으로 존재하여야만 합니다. 이것이 바로 하느님이십니다. 다섯 번째 방식은 이러한 세상에 보여지고 있는 질서와 통치(the order and government)를 생각함으로써 입니다. 사물들은 명확한 방식으로 작용하며 그리고 그렇게 작용하도록 분명하게 보여지도록 과거에 설계되어졌으며(were designed), 그리고 그들의 본성(nature) [즉, 그들의 활동 중인 혹은 작용 중인 본질(essence)]을 통하여 그들은 자신들의 작용들로 통치되고 있습니다(are governed).(***) 그러므로 이 세상에는 설계와 통치가 있습니다. 따라서 한 개의 첫 번째 설계자 및 첫 번째 통치자((a first designer and first governor)가 궁극적으로 존재하여야만 합니다. 그리고 설계와 통치 둘 다가 지능(intelligence)을 수반하기에. 첫 번째이며 절대적인 지능(the first and absolute intelligence)인 통치자 및 설계자가 존재하여야만 합니다. 이 분이 바로 하느님이십니다.
-----
즉, 신학적으로 대단히 중요한 용어이며 영어로 "perfection"으로 번역되고 있는 표현을, 우리말 번역 용어로서, "완전", "완전성", 혹은 심지어 "완덕"으로 번역하지 않고, 완미(完美)로 번역한 이유는 다음의 글들에서, 충분한 근거 자료료들의 제시와 함께, 매우 자세하게 밝히고 있으니, 필독을 권고한다:
========================================
출처 1: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/1002.htm 출처 2: http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ENG0023/__P2.HTM
신학 대전 Ia
Question 2. The existence of God
질문 2. 하느님께서 존재하심
Because the chief aim of sacred doctrine is to teach the knowledge of
성스러운 교리의 주된 목적이, 이미 말해졌던 바로부터 분명하듯이, 하느님에 대한 지식을, 당신께서 그 자체로서 뿐만이 아니라, 또한 당신께서는 사물들의, 그리고 특별히 이성적 피조물들의, 시작(beginning, principium)이며 그리고 그들의 마지막 끝(last end)으로서, 가르치는 것이기에, 그러므로, 이러한 과학/학문(science)을 상술하고자 하는 우리의 노력에 있어, 우리는 다음과 같이 다룰 것입니다: (1) 하느님에 대하여, (2) 하느님을 향한 이성적 피조물들의 나아감에 대하여, (3) 사람으로서, 하느님께로 가는 우리의 길인, 그리스도에 대하여.
In treating of God there will be a threefold division, for we shall
하느님에 대하여 다룸에 있어 어떤 삼중(threefold)의 구분이 있을 것인데, 이는 우리가 다음과 같이 생각할 것이기 때문입니다: (1) 하느님의 본질(the Divine Essence)에 관계하는 무엇이든지, (2) 위격(Person)들의 구분들에 관계하는 무엇이든지, (3) 당신으로부터 피조물들의 나옴(procession)에 관계하는 무엇이든지.
하느님의 본질과 관련하여, 우리는 다음과 같이 생각하여야만 합니다: (1) 하느님께서 존재하시는지? (2) 당신의 존재의 방식, 혹은, 오히려, 당신의 존재의 방식이 아닌 바, (3) 당신의 작용들, 즉 당신의 지식, 의지, 힘에 관계하는 무엇이든지. Concerning the first, there are three points of inquiry:
첫 번째에 관련한, 질문에 있어서의 세 개의 요지(points)들이 다음과 같이 있습니다:(*)
-----
1. Is the proposition "God exists" self-evident?
Article 1. Whether the existence of God is self-evident?
Objection 2. Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.
Objection 3. Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.
On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Psalm 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.
I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature — namely, by effects.
Reply to Objection 1. To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.
Reply to Objection 2. Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.
Reply to Objection 3. The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.
Article 2. Whether it can be demonstrated that God exists?
Objection 2. Further, the essence is the middle term of demonstration. But we cannot know in what God's essence consists, but solely in what it does not consist; as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 4). Therefore we cannot demonstrate that God exists.
Objection 3. Further, if the existence of God were demonstrated, this could only be from His effects. But His effects are not proportionate to Him, since He is infinite and His effects are finite; and between the finite and infinite there is no proportion. Therefore, since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect not proportionate to it, it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated.
On the contrary, The Apostle says: "The invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Romans 1:20). But this would not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the things that are made; for the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists.
I answer that, Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called "a priori," and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration "a posteriori"; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.
Reply to Objection 1. The existence of God and other like truths about God, which can be known by natural reason, are not articles of faith, but are preambles to the articles; for faith presupposes natural knowledge, even as grace presupposes nature, and perfection supposes something that can be perfected. Nevertheless, there is nothing to prevent a man, who cannot grasp a proof, accepting, as a matter of faith, something which in itself is capable of being scientifically known and demonstrated.
Reply to Objection 2. When the existence of a cause is demonstrated from an effect, this effect takes the place of the definition of the cause in proof of the cause's existence. This is especially the case in regard to God, because, in order to prove the existence of anything, it is necessary to accept as a middle term the meaning of the word, and not its essence, for the question of its essence follows on the question of its existence. Now the names given to God are derived from His effects; consequently, in demonstrating the existence of God from His effects, we may take for the middle term the meaning of the word "God".
Reply to Objection 3. From effects not proportionate to the cause no perfect knowledge of that cause can be obtained. Yet from every effect the existence of the cause can be clearly demonstrated, and so we can demonstrate the existence of God from His effects; though from them we cannot perfectly know God as He is in His essence.
Article 3. Whether God exists?
Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.
On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Exodus 3:14)
I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.
The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.
The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.
The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus.
We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be.
But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.
Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence.
Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing.
그런데 만약에 이것이 참(true)이었다면, 심지어 지금(now) 존재 상태에 아무런 사물(nothing)도 없어야만 하는데, 왜냐하면 현재 존재하지 않는다는 바로 그 사물은 오로지 이미 존재하는 어떠한 사물(something)에 의하여만 존재하기 시작하기 때문입니다.
Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd.
Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary.
But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. 그러나 모든 필연적인 사물(necessary thing)은, 다른 것에 의하여 야기되는 그 필연성을 가지거나, 혹은 그렇지 않는 것, 둘 중의 하나입니다.
Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes.
Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.
This all men speak of as God.
----- -----
The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaph. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.
The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.
Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2. Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.
0 1,598 1
|
