가톨릭 신앙생활 Q&A 코너
|
Ia IIae q23. 정(情, passions)들의 구분[신학대전여행] 1295_passions |
|---|
|
2012-12-10 ㅣ No.1307
23. The Distinction of the Passions 23. 정(情, passions)들의 구분 1. The word passion means an undergoing. When sensitive appetite operates, the body undergoes some modification, some change. Sometimes such change is manifested outwardly, as, for instance, in the bright eye and animated manner of a person speaking of what he loves; or in the flushed face and stammering tongue of a man who is very angry. Passion is a kind of recoil or kick-back of the operation of sentient appetite; it is what a sentient being undergoes because of the functioning of such appetite. There are two kinds of passions, and they take their general names from the appetites they follow; thus we distinguish the concupiscible passions which follow the concupiscible appetites, and the irascible passions which follow the irascible appetites. The concupiscible passions are: love and hatred; desire and aversion; joy or delight, and sorrow or grief or pain. The irascible passions are: hope and despair; fear (timidity) and courage (daring), and anger.
1. 정(情, passion)(*)라는 단어는 어떤 경험함(an undergoing)을 뜻합니다. 외부의 작인(作因)/동인(動因)(external agents)들에 의하여 흥분하게 될 수 있는 욕구(sensitive appetite)가 작동할(operates) 때에, 몸은 어떤 변경(some modification)을, 어떤 변화(some change)를 경험합니다. 때로는 그러한 변화가, 예를 들어, 자신이 사랑하는 바에 대하여 말하는 어떤 자의 빛나는 눈과 활기에 찬 태도(animated manner)에서, 혹은 매우 분노한 어떤 사람의 홍조를 띄게 된 얼굴과 더듬거리는 말투에서 겉으로 분명하게 나타나게 됩니다. 정(情, passion)은 감각 인상(sense impressions)에 반응하는 욕구의 작동에 의한 어떤 종류의 되튐(recoil) 혹은 반동(kick-back)이며, 그리하여 그것은 어떤 감각 인상(sense impressions)에 반응하는 있음(a sentient being)이 그러한 욕구의 기능 행위(functioning) 때문에 경험하는(undergoes) 바입니다. 두 종류의 정(情, passions)들이 있으며, 그리고 그들은 자신들이 뒤따르는(follow) 욕구들로부터 자신들의 일반적 이름들을 취하며, 그리하여 그 결과 우리는 사욕(私慾, concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는 욕구(the concupiscible appetites)들을 뒤따르는 사욕(私慾, concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는 정(情)(the concupiscible passions)들과 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는 욕구(the irascible appetites)들을 뒤따르는 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는 정(情)(the irascible passions)들을 구분합니다.(**) 사욕(私慾, concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는 정(情, passions)들은 다음과 같습니다: 사랑(love)과 증오(hatred), 욕망(desire or concupiscence)과 혐오(aversion), 기쁨(joy) 혹은 환희(delight), 그리고 후회/뉘우침(sorrow) 혹은 비탄(grief) 혹은 아픔(pain). 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는 정(情, passions)들은 다음과 같습니다: 희망(hope)과 절망(despair), 두려움(fear)[소심(timidity)]과 용기(courage)[대담무쌍(daring)], 그리고 분노(anger).
----- concupiscible : 1 : motivated by a desire for good under the aspect of the agreeable especially the sensuously agreeable -- used chiefly by Scholastic philosophers of the appetite and the passions; opposed to irascible iracible : 2 a : moved by desire for that which is attained only with difficulty or danger b : stirred by combative emotions (as anger, pride, courage, fear) -- opposed to concupiscible (2) 그러나 대단히 유감스럽게도, 번역 용어들로서 이들 두 단어들의 글자 그대로의 의미를 나타내는 한자 단어들을 찾을 수 없어, 그리고 이들 두 단어들의 자구적 의미가 설명되고 있지 않은 다음의 자료들을 또한 참고하여, "concupiscible" 는 "사욕(私慾[이기적인 욕심], concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는" 으로 번역하였고, "irascible" 는 "분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는" 으로 번역하였다. 그러나 이들 번역 용어들의 정확한 의미가, 바로 위의 (1) 에서 고찰한 바와 같이, 각각 '동의할 수 있는, 특히 감각적으로 동의할 수 있는, 것들로 구성된 국면 아래에서 선(good)으로 기울어지는 어떤 욕망에 의하여 동기가 부여되는(concupiscible)' 및 '어려움 혹은 위험과 함께 오로지 획득되는 바로 그러한 것으로 기울어지는 욕망에 의하여 움직이게 되는(iracible)' 임을 숙지하도록 하라:
2. The concupiscible passions stand related to good and evil simply. Love is for good, hatred for evil; desire is for good, aversion for evil; joy is for good, sorrow for evil. But the irascible passions are related to good and evil under the aspect of difficulty. Hope is for a good in some degree difficult to achieve; despair is for an evil too difficult to avoid; fear is for an evil hard to escape; courage is for a good difficult to attain; anger is resentment of an evil difficult to throw off. As they work out, all irascible passions turn into concupiscible passions: hope and courage, once successful, are turned into love and joy; anger, fear, and despair, when their force is spent, end in sorrow, and sometimes, when they have been mistaken or groundless, they end in joy.
2. 사욕(私慾, concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는 정(情)(the concupiscible passions)들은 단순히(simply) 선(good)과 악(evil)에 관련되어 일어납니다(stand). 사랑(love)은 선(good)에 대하여, 증오(hatred)는 악(evil)에 대하여, 그리고 욕망(desire)은 선에 대하여, 혐오(aversion)는 악(evil)에 대하여, 그리고 기쁨(joy)은 선(good)에 대하여, 후회/뉘우침(sorrow)은 악(evil)에 대하여. 그러나 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는 정(情)(the irascible passions)들은 어려움의 국면 아래에서(under the aspect of difficulty) 선(good)과 악(evil)에 관련되어 있습니다. 희망(hope)은 성취하기(achieve) 힘든 어떤 정도에 있는 어떤 선(a good)에 대한 것이며, 그리고 절망(자포자기, despair)은 너무 힘들어서 회피할 수(avoid) 없는 어떤 악(an evil)에 대한 것이며, 그리고 두려움(fear)은 탈출하기(escape) 힘든 어떤 악에 대한 것이며, 그리고 용기(courage)는 획득하기(attain) 힘든 어떤 선에 대한 것이며, 그리고 분노(anger)는 버리기(throw off) 힘든 어떤 악에 대한 분개(resentment) 입니다. 그들은 어떤 요망되는 혹은 성공적인 방식으로 발전함에 따라, 모든, 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는, 정(情)(irascible passions)들은 다음과 같이 사욕(私慾, concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는 정(情)(concupiscible passions)들로 바뀝니다: 희망과 용기는, 일단 성공적이면, 사랑과 기쁨으로 바뀌게 되며, 그리고 분노, 두려움, 그리고 절망은, 그들의 힘이 지치게 되었을 때에, 후회/뉘우침(sorrow)으로 끝나며, 그리고 때로는, 그들이 오해를 받아왔거나 혹은 근거가 없을 때에, 그들은 기쁨(joy)으로 끝납니다.
3. Anger is the only passion of the soul which is not paired off with a contrary passion. For anger stands alone among the passions in having no natural contrary. Serenity might be called a contrary state, but serenity is not a passion.
3. 분노(anger)는, 어떤 상반되는 정(情, passion)과 함께 짝지어지지 않는, 영혼의 유일한 정(情)입니다. 이는 분노가, 자연적 정반대를 전혀 가지지 않음에 있어, 정(情)들 중에서 홀로 서 있기(stands) 때문입니다. 침착(serenity)이 어떤 반대의 상태라고 불릴 수도 있을 것이나, 그러나 침착은 어떤 정(情)이 아닙니다.
4. Some passions are specifically distinct (within their genus as concupiscible or irascible) without being opposed. Thus love and joy are specifically different passions, but they can exist together with reference to the same object. Nay, one may cause the other, as love for a good thing attained causes joy in possessing it.
4. 일부 정(情, passions)들은 반대됨 없이 [그들의 속(屬, genus)(*) 안쪽에서 사욕(私慾, concupiscence)에 의하여 동기가 부여되는 것으로서 혹은 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는 것으로서] 구체적으로 구분됩니다. 따라서 사랑(love)과 기쁨(joy)은 구체적으로 다른 정(情)들이나, 그러나 그들은 동일한 대상과 관련하여 함께 존재할 수 있습니다. 오히려(nay), 어떤 선한 사물에 대하여 획득된 사랑(love)이 그것을 소유함에 있어서의 기쁨(joy)을 야기하듯이, 하나는 다른 하나를 야기할 수도 있을 것입니다. ====================
출처 1: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2023.htm 출처 3: http://www.logicmuseum.com/wiki/Authors/Thomas_Aquinas/Summa_Theologiae/Part_IIa/Q23
신학 대전 Ia IIae Question 23. How the passions differ from one another We must now consider how the passions differ from one another: and under
이제 우리는 정(情, passions)들이 서로 어떻게 다른지를 고찰하여야만 하며, 그리고 이러한 표제 아래에서 질문에 있어서의 네 개의 요지들이 다음과 같이 있습니다:
Article 1. Whether the passions of the concupiscible part are different from those of the irascible part? Objection 1. It would seem that the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible parts. For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 5) that the passions of the soul are those emotions "which are followed by joy or sorrow." But joy and sorrow are in the concupiscible part. Therefore all the passions are in the concupiscible part, and not some in the irascible, others in the concupiscible part.
Objection 2. Further, on the words of Matthew 13:33, "The kingdom of heaven is like to leaven," etc., Jerome's gloss says: "We should have prudence in the reason; hatred of vice in the irascible faculty; desire of virtue, in the concupiscible part." But hatred is in the concupiscible faculty, as also is love, of which it is the contrary, as is stated in Topic. ii, 7. Therefore the same passion is in the concupiscible and irascible faculties.
Objection 3. Further, passions and actions differ specifically according to their objects. But the objects of the irascible and concupiscible passions are the same, viz. good and evil. Therefore the same passions are in the irascible and concupiscible faculties.
On the contrary, The acts of the different powers differ in species; for instance, to see, and to hear. But the irascible and the concupiscible are two powers into which the sensitive appetite is divided, as stated in the I, 81, 2. Therefore, since the passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Question 22, Article 3), the passions of the irascible faculty are specifically distinct from those of the concupiscible part.
I answer that, The passions of the irascible part differ in species from those of the concupiscible faculty. For since different powers have different objects, as stated in the I, 77, 3, the passions of different powers must of necessity be referred to different objects. Much more, therefore, do the passions of different faculties differ in species; since a greater difference in the object is required to diversify the species of the powers, than to diversify the species of passions or actions. For just as in the physical order, diversity of genus arises from diversity in the potentiality of matter, while diversity of species arises from diversity of form in the same matter; so in the acts of the soul, those that belong to different powers, differ not only in species but also in genus, while acts and passions regarding different specific objects, included under the one common object of a single power, differ as the species of that genus.
In order, therefore, to discern which passions are in the irascible, and which in the concupiscible, we must take the object of each of these powers. For we have stated in the I, 81, 2, that the object of the concupiscible power is sensible good or evil, simply apprehended as such, which causes pleasure or pain. But, since the soul must, of necessity, experience difficulty or struggle at times, in acquiring some such good, or in avoiding some such evil, in so far as such good or evil is more than our animal nature can easily acquire or avoid; therefore this very good or evil, inasmuch as it is of an arduous or difficult nature, is the object of the irascible faculty. Therefore whatever passions regard good or evil absolutely, belong to the concupiscible power; for instance, joy, sorrow, love, hatred, and such like: whereas those passions which regard good or bad as arduous, through being difficult to obtain or avoid, belong to the irascible faculty; such are daring, fear, hope and the like.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in the I, 81, 2, the irascible faculty is bestowed on animals, in order to remove the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible power from tending towards its object, either by making some good difficult to obtain, or by making some evil hard to avoid. The result is that all the irascible passions terminate in the concupiscible passions: and thus it is that even the passions which are in the irascible faculty are followed by joy and sadness which are in the concupiscible faculty.
Reply to Objection 2. Jerome ascribes hatred of vice to the irascible faculty, not by reason of hatred, which is properly a concupiscible passion; but on account of the struggle, which belongs to the irascible power.
Reply to Objection 3. Good, inasmuch as it is delightful, moves the concupiscible power. But if it prove difficult to obtain, from this very fact it has a certain contrariety to the concupiscible power: and hence the need of another power tending to that good. The same applies to evil. And this power is the irascible faculty. Consequently the concupiscible passions are specifically different from the irascible passions.
Article 2. Whether the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on the contrariety of good and evil? Objection 1. It would seem that the contrariety of the irascible passions is based on no other contrariety than that of good and evil. For the irascible passions are ordained to the concupiscible passions, as stated above (01, ad 1). But the contrariety of the concupiscible passions is no other than that of good and evil; take, for instance, love and hatred, joy and sorrow. Therefore the same applies to the irascible passions.
Objection 2. Further, passions differ according to their objects; just as movements differ according to their termini. But there is no other contrariety of movements, except that of the termini, as is stated in Phys. v, 3. Therefore there is no other contrariety of passions, save that of the objects. Now the object of the appetite is good or evil. Therefore in no appetitive power can there be contrariety of passions other than that of good and evil.
Objection 3. Further, "every passion of the soul is by way of approach and withdrawal," as Avicenna declares in his sixth book of Physics. Now approach results from the apprehension of good; withdrawal, from the apprehension of evil: since just as "good is what all desire" (Ethic. i, 1), so evil is what all shun. Therefore, in the passions of the soul, there can be no other contrariety than that of good and evil.
On the contrary, Fear and daring are contrary to one another, as stated in Ethic. iii, 7. But fear and daring do not differ in respect of good and evil: because each regards some kind of evil. Therefore not every contrariety of the irascible passions is that of good and evil.
I answer that, Passion is a kind of movement, as stated in Phys. iii, 3. Therefore contrariety of passions is based on contrariety of movements or changes. Now there is a twofold contrariety in changes and movements, as stated in Phys. v, 5. One is according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term: and this contrariety belongs properly to changes, i.e. to generation, which is a change "to being," and to corruption, which is a change "from being." The other contrariety is according to opposition of termini, and belongs properly to movements: thus whitening, which is movement from black to white, is contrary to blackening, which is movement from white to black.
Accordingly there is a twofold contrariety in the passions of the soul: one, according to contrariety of objects, i.e. of good and evil; the other, according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term. In the concupiscible passions the former contrariety alone is to be found; viz. that which is based on the objects: whereas in the irascible passions, we find both forms of contrariety. The reason of this is that the object of the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Article 1), is sensible good or evil considered absolutely. Now good, as such, cannot be a term wherefrom, but only a term whereto, since nothing shuns good as such; on the contrary, all things desire it. In like manner, nothing desires evil, as such; but all things shun it: wherefore evil cannot have the aspect of a term whereto, but only of a term wherefrom. Accordingly every concupiscible passion in respect of good, tends to it, as love, desire and joy; while every concupiscible passion in respect of evil, tends from it, as hatred, avoidance or dislike, and sorrow. Wherefore, in the concupiscible passions, there can be no contrariety of approach and withdrawal in respect of the same object.
On the other hand, the object of the irascible faculty is sensible good or evil, considered not absolutely, but under the aspect of difficulty or arduousness. Now the good which is difficult or arduous, considered as good, is of such a nature as to produce in us a tendency to it, which tendency pertains to the passion of "hope"; whereas, considered as arduous or difficult, it makes us turn from it; and this pertains to the passion of "despair." In like manner the arduous evil, considered as an evil, has the aspect of something to be shunned; and this belongs to the passion of "fear": but it also contains a reason for tending to it, as attempting something arduous, whereby to escape being subject to evil; and this tendency is called "daring." Consequently, in the irascible passions we find contrariety in respect of good and evil (as between hope and fear): and also contrariety according to approach and withdrawal in respect of the same term (as between daring and fear). From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Article 3. Whether any passion of the soul has no contrariety? Objection 1. It would seem that every passion of the soul has a contrary. For every passion of the soul is either in the irascible or in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Article 1). But both kinds of passion have their respective modes of contrariety. Therefore every passion of the soul has its contrary. Objection 2. Further, every passion of the soul has either good or evil for its object; for these are the common objects of the appetitive part. But a passion having good for its object, is contrary to a passion having evil for its object. Therefore every passion has a contrary.
Objection 3. Further, every passion of the soul is in respect of approach or withdrawal, as stated above (Article 2). But every approach has a corresponding contrary withdrawal, and vice versa. Therefore every passion of the soul has a contrary.
On the contrary, Anger is a passion of the soul. But no passion is set down as being contrary to anger, as stated in Ethic. iv, 5. Therefore not every passion has a contrary.
I answer that, The passion of anger is peculiar in this, that it cannot have a contrary, either according to approach and withdrawal, or according to the contrariety of good and evil. For anger is caused by a difficult evil already present: and when such an evil is present, the appetite must needs either succumb, so that it does not go beyond the limits of "sadness," which is a concupiscible passion; or else it has a movement of attack on the hurtful evil, which movement is that of "anger." But it cannot have a movement of withdrawal: because the evil is supposed to be already present or past. Thus no passion is contrary to anger according to contrariety of approach and withdrawal.
In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty. Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain any other movement, except the appetite's repose in the good obtained; which repose belongs to joy, which is a passion of the concupiscible faculty.
Accordingly no movement of the soul can be contrary to the movement of anger, and nothing else than cessation from its movement is contrary thereto; thus the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 3) that "calm is contrary to anger," by opposition not of contrariety but of negation or privation.
From what has been said the replies to the objections are evident.
Article 4. Whether in the same power, there are any passions, specifically different, but not contrary to one another? Objection 1. It would seem that there cannot be, in the same power, specifically different passions that are not contrary to one another. For the passions of the soul differ according to their objects. Now the objects of the soul's passions are good and evil; and on this distinction is based the contrariety of the passions. Therefore no passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, differ specifically.
Objection 2. Further, difference of species implies a difference of form. But every difference of form is in respect of some contrariety, as stated in Metaph. x, 8. Therefore passions of the same power, that are not contrary to one another, do not differ specifically.
Objection 3. Further, since every passion of the soul consists in approach or withdrawal in respect of good or evil, it seems that every difference in the passions of the soul must needs arise from the difference of good and evil; or from the difference of approach and withdrawal; or from degrees in approach or withdrawal. Now the first two differences cause contrariety in the passions of the soul, as stated above (Article 2): whereas the third difference does not diversify the species; else the species of the soul's passions would be infinite. Therefore it is not possible for passions of the same power to differ in species, without being contrary to one another.
On the contrary, Love and joy differ in species, and are in the concupiscible power; and yet they are not contrary to one another; rather, in fact, one causes the other. Therefore in the same power there are passions that differ in species without being contrary to one another.
I answer that, Passions differ in accordance with their active causes, which, in the case of the passions of the soul, are their objects. Now, the difference in active causes may be considered in two ways: first, from the point of view of their species or nature, as fire differs from water; secondly, from the point of view of the difference in their active power. In the passions of the soul we can treat the difference of their active or motive causes in respect of their motive power, as if they were natural agents. For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same applies to the cause of repulsion.
Now, in the movements of the appetitive faculty, good has, as it were, a force of attraction, while evil has a force of repulsion. In the first place, therefore, good causes, in the appetitive power, a certain inclination, aptitude or connaturalness in respect of good: and this belongs to the passion of "love": the corresponding contrary of which is "hatred" in respect of evil. Secondly, if the good be not yet possessed, it causes in the appetite a movement towards the attainment of the good beloved: and this belongs to the passion of "desire" or "concupiscence": and contrary to it, in respect of evil, is the passion of "aversion" or "dislike." Thirdly, when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of "delight" or "joy"; the contrary of which, in respect of evil, is "sorrow" or "sadness."
On the other hand, in the irascible passions, the aptitude, or inclination to seek good, or to shun evil, is presupposed as arising from the concupiscible faculty, which regards good or evil absolutely. And in respect of good not yet obtained, we have "hope" and "despair." In respect of evil not yet present we have "fear" and "daring." But in respect of good obtained there is no irascible passion: because it is no longer considered in the light of something arduous, as stated above (Article 3). But evil already present gives rise to the passion of "anger."
Accordingly it is clear that in the concupiscible faculty there are three couples of passions; viz. love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. In like manner there are three groups in the irascible faculty; viz. hope and despair, fear and daring, and anger which has not contrary passion.
Consequently there are altogether eleven passions differing specifically; six in the concupiscible faculty, and five in the irascible; and under these all the passions of the soul are contained. From this the replies to the objections are evident.
---------- 번역자: 교수 소순태 마태오 (Ph.D.) 0 1,447 1
|
