번역자 주: 다음은, 성 토마스 아퀴나스의 신학 대전의 약 600여 개에 달하는 각 문항(Questions)들에 대한 "압축된 바꾸어 말하기"인 Paul J. Glenn 몬시뇰(1893-1957)의 저서: "A Tour of the Summa(신학대전여행)"의 IIa IIae q110, 거짓말하기(lying) 전문이며, 그리고 하반부의 글은, 상반부의 글에 대응하는 성 토마스 아퀴나스의 신학 대전, IIa IIae q110, 거짓말하기(lying) 전문이다.
초벌 번역 일자: 2013년 3월 30일
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110. Lying
110. 거짓말하기
1. Lying or mendacity is a vice opposed to the virtue of truthfulness. A lie is the intentional telling of a falsehood. But the intention to deceive does not enter into the essence of a lie. Any serious statement which is opposed to the truth as known by the speaker is a lie, whether the speaker intends to deceive anyone or not. And if a speaker says what he honestly thinks is true, but is, in fact, not true, the speaker does not tell a lie. His words make the material for a lie, but they lack the form or essential determinant of a lie. The essential determinant, or form, of a lie is the intention to speak falsely.
1. 거짓말하기(lying) 혹은 거짓말하는 것(mendacity)은 정직의 상태(truthfulness)라는 덕(virtue)에 상반되는 한 개의 악습(a vice)입니다. 거짓말(a lie)은 어떤 부정직의 상태(a falsehood)에 대한 의도적인 말함(intentional telling)입니다. 그러나 속이고자 하는 의도(intention to deceive)는 어떤 거짓말의 본질의 한 부분이 아닙니다(not enter into). 화자(the speaker)에 의하여 알게 된 바대로의 진리에 반대되는(opposed to the truth) 모든 진지한 말함(serious statement)은, 화자가 어떤 자를 속이고자 의도하든지(intends) 혹은 의도하지 아니 하든지 간에, 한 개의 거짓말입니다. 그리고 만약에 어떤 화자가 자신이 성실하게(honestly) 생각하는 바가 참(true)이라고 말하나, 그러나, 그것이, 사실은, 참이 아니면, 이 화자는 어떤 거짓말을 말한 것이 아닙니다. 그의 말(words)들은 어떤 거짓말을 위한 질료(material)을 만드나, 그러나 이 말들은 형상(form) 혹은 어떤 거짓말의 본질적 결정자(essential determinant)가 없습니다(lack). 어떤 거짓말의 본질적 결정자, 혹은 형상은, 참이 아니게 말하고자 하는 의도(intention)를 말합니다.
2. Lies are called officious, jocose, or mischievous, according as they are told for profit or convenience, for pleasure or entertainment, or for the purpose of hurting someone or causing trouble. The mischievous lie is the worst of lies; it is often called a malicious lie, for it is the fruit of malice or bad will.
2. 거짓말들은, 득(profit) 혹은 편의(convenience)를 위하여, 즐거움(pleasure) 혹은 오락(entertainment)을 위하여, 혹은 다른 자를 해치기 위한 혹은 곤란(trouble)을 야기하기 위한 목적 때문에, 그들이 말해짐에 따라서, 호의적이다(officious), 익살맞다(jocose), 혹은 유해하다(mischievous)라고 불립니다. 유해한 거짓말은 거짓말들 중에서 가장 나쁘며, 그리고 이 거짓말은 악의적인 거짓말(a malicious lie)이라고 자주 불리는데, 이는 그것이 악의 혹은 나쁜 의지의 열매이기 때문입니다.
3. A lie is always evil. For it is an inordinate and unreasonable thing, and hence an evil, to employ speech, which is the natural instrument for expressing what is in the mind, as a means of expressing what is not in the mind. It is not evil to evade a question; that is, it is not evil, except under extraordinary circumstances, to keep what one knows to oneself. But it is evil to tell lies. Similarly, it is not evil to elude the salesman who wishes us to buy something; it is not evil to keep one's money in one's pocket; but it is evil to buy what the salesman offers with counterfeit money. It is not evil either to speak in figurative language, provided those who hear can, or should, understand what is meant.
3. 거짓말은 항상 악입니다(evil). 이는 마음 안에 있는 바를 표현하는 자연적 도구인, 말(speech)을, 마음에 있지 않은 바를 표현하는 어떤 수단으로서 쓰는(employ) 것은 어떤 과도(過度)한(inordinate) 그리고 이성적이 아닌(unreasonable) 일(thing)이며, 그리하여 그 결과 한 개의 악(an evil)입니다. 어떤 질문을 회피하는 것은(evade) 악이 아니며, 즉, 자신이 아는 바를 비밀로 간직하는 것은, 극히 예외적인 상황 하에서가 아니라면, 악이 아닙니다. 그러나 거짓말을 하는 것은 악입니다. 유사하게, 우리가 어떤 것을 구매하기를 바라는 외판원(salesman)을 피하는(elude) 것은 악이 아니며, 그리하여 자신의 현금을 자신의 주머니 안에 지니고 있는 것은 악이 아니나, 그러나 외판원이 제시하는 바를 위폐(counterfeit money)로써 구매하는 것은 악입니다. 비유적인 언어로 말하는 것도, 듣는 이들이 또한 빗대어 말해지는 바를 이해할 수 있거나, 혹은 반드시 이해할 경우라고 한다면, 악이 아닙니다.
4. A malicious lie may be a mortal sin, for it can be agrave offense against charity and justice as well as against truthfulness. But jocose lies (when they are really lies at all) and officious lies are usually venially sinful. A jocose lie often fails to have the character of a lie because it is not a serious statement; those who utter such things, and those who hear, are well aware that the speaker is not manifesting his mind, his knowledge, or his convictions, but is merely jesting.
4. 악의적 거짓말은 한 개의 대죄(a mortal sin)인데, 이는 그것이 정직함의 상태(truthfulness)에 반할 뿐만이 아니라 애덕(charity)과 의덕(justice)에 반하는 중대한 침범(offense)일 수 있기 때문입니다. 익살맞은 거짓말들은 [그들이 실제로 조금이나마(at all) 거짓말들 이라고 할 때에] 그리고 호의적인 거짓말들은 보통 경미하게(venially) 죄가 있습니다(sinful). 익살맞은 거짓말은, 그것이 어떤 진지한 말이 아니기 때문에, 어떤 거짓말의 특징을 가지는 것에 자주 실패하며, 그리고 그러한 것들을 발언하는 자들, 그리고 듣는 이들은, 화자가 자신의 마음, 자신의 지식, 혹은 자신의 확신(convictions)들을 표명하는 것이 아니고, 단지 익살을 부리고 있음을 잘 알아차립니다.
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우리말 번역문 출처: http://club.catholic.or.kr/tourofsumma
영어본 원문 출처: http://www.catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part2B.php?q=112
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출처 1: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/3110.htm
출처 2: http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ENG0023/__PAN.HTM
신학 대전 IIa IIae
Question 110. The vices opposed to truth, and first of lying
1.Is lying, as containing falsehood, always opposed to truth?
2.The species of lying
3.Is lying always a sin?
4.Is it always a mortal sin?
Article 1. Whether lying is always opposed to truth?
Objection 1. It seems that lying is not always opposed to truth. For opposites are incompatible with one another. But lying is compatible with truth, since that speaks the truth, thinking it to be false, lies, according to Augustine (Lib. De Mendac. iii). Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
Objection 2. Further, the virtue of truth applies not only to words but also to deeds, since according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) by this virtue one tells the truth both in one's speech and in one's life. But lying applies only to words, for Augustine says (Contra Mend. xii) that "a lie is a false signification by words." Accordingly, it seems that lying is not directly opposed to the virtue of truth.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mendac. iii) that the "liar's sin is the desire to deceive." But this is not opposed to truth, but rather to benevolence or justice. Therefore lying is not opposed to truth.
On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Mend. x): "Let no one doubt that it is a lie to tell a falsehood in order to deceive. Wherefore a false statement uttered with intent to deceive is a manifest lie." But this is opposed to truth. Therefore lying is opposed to truth.
I answer that, A moral act takes its species from two things, its object, and its end: for the end is the object of the will, which is the first mover in moral acts. And the power moved by the will has its own object, which is the proximate object of the voluntary act, and stands in relation to the will's act towards the end, as material to formal, as stated above (I-II, 18, 6,7).
Now it has been said above (109, 1, ad 3) that the virtue of truth--and consequently the opposite vices--regards a manifestation made by certain signs: and this manifestation or statement is an act of reason comparing sign with the thing signified; because every representation consists in comparison, which is the proper act of the reason. Wherefore though dumb animals manifest something, yet they do not intend to manifest anything: but they do something by natural instinct, and a manifestation is the result. But when this manifestation or statement is a moral act, it must needs be voluntary, and dependent on the intention of the will. Now the proper object of a manifestation or statement is the true or the false. And the intention of a bad will may bear on two things: one of which is that a falsehood may be told; while the other is the proper effect of a false statement, namely, that someone may be deceived.
Accordingly if these three things concur, namely, falsehood of what is said, the will to tell a falsehood, and finally the intention to deceive, then there is falsehood--materially, since what is said is false, formally, on account of the will to tell an untruth, and effectively, on account of the will to impart a falsehood.
However, the essential notion of a lie is taken from formal falsehood, from the fact namely, that a person intends to say what is false; wherefore also the word "mendacium" [lie] is derived from its being in opposition to the "mind." Consequently if one says what is false, thinking it to be true, it is false materially, but not formally, because the falseness is beside the intention of the speaker so that it is not a perfect lie, since what is beside the speaker's intention is accidental for which reason it cannot be a specific difference. If, on the other hand, one utters' falsehood formally, through having the will to deceive, even if what one says be true, yet inasmuch as this is a voluntary and moral act, it contains falseness essentially and truth accidentally, and attains the specific nature of a lie.
That a person intends to cause another to have a false opinion, by deceiving him, does not belong to the species of lying, but to perfection thereof, even as in the physical order, a thing acquires its species if it has its form, even though the form's effect be lacking; for instance a heavy body which is held up aloft by force, lest it come down in accordance with the exigency of its form. Therefore it is evident that lying is directly an formally opposed to the virtue of truth.
Reply to Objection 1. We judge of a thing according to what is in it formally and essentially rather than according to what is in it materially and accidentally. Hence it is more in opposition to truth, considered as a moral virtue, to tell the truth with the intention of telling a falsehood than to tell a falsehood with the intention of telling the truth.
Reply to Objection 2. As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. ii), words hold the chief place among other signs. And so when it is said that "a lie is a false signification by words," the term "words" denotes every kind of sign. Wherefore if a person intended to signify something false by means of signs, he would not be excused from lying.
Reply to Objection 3. The desire to deceive belongs to the perfection of lying, but not to its species, as neither does any effect belong to the species of its cause.
Article 2. Whether lies are sufficiently divided into officious, jocose, and mischievous lies?
Objection 1. It seems that lies are not sufficiently divided into "officious," "jocose" and "mischievous" lies. For a division should be made according to that which pertains to a thing by reason of its nature, as the Philosopher states (Metaph. vii, text. 43; De Part. Animal i, 3). But seemingly the intention of the effect resulting from a moral act is something beside and accidental to the species of that act, so that an indefinite number of effects can result from one act. Now this division is made according to the intention of the effect: for a "jocose" lie is told in order to make fun, an "officious" lie for some useful purpose, and a "mischievous" lie in order to injure someone. Therefore lies are unfittingly divided in this way.
Objection 2. Further, Augustine (Contra Mendac. xiv) gives eight kinds of lies. The first is "in religious doctrine"; the second is "a lie that profits no one and injures someone"; the third "profits one party so as to injure another"; the fourth is "told out of mere lust of lying and deceiving"; the fifth is "told out of the desire to please"; the sixth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving his money"; the seventh "injures no one and profits someone in saving him from death"; the eighth "injures no one, and profits someone in saving him from defilement of the body." Therefore it seems that the first division of lies is insufficient.
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7) divides lying into "boasting," which exceeds the truth in speech, and "irony," which falls short of the truth by saying something less: and these two are not contained under any one of the kinds mentioned above. Therefore it seems that the aforesaid division of lies is inadequate.
On the contrary, A gloss on Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," says "that there are three kinds of lies; for some are told for the wellbeing and convenience of someone; and there is another kind of lie that is told in fun; but the third kind of lie is told out of malice." The first of these is called an officious lie, the second a jocose lie, the third a mischievous lie. Therefore lies are divided into these three kinds.
I answer that, Lies may be divided in three ways. First, with respect to their nature as lies: and this is the proper and essential division of lying. On this way, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 7), lies are of two kinds, namely, the lie which goes beyond the truth, and this belongs to "boasting," and the lie which stops short of the truth, and this belongs to "irony." This division is an essential division of lying itself, because lying as such is opposed to truth, as stated in the preceding Article: and truth is a kind of equality, to which more and less are in essential opposition.
Secondly, lies may be divided with respect to their nature as sins, and with regard to those things that aggravate or diminish the sin of lying, on the part of the end intended. Now the sin of lying is aggravated, if by lying a person intends to injure another, and this is called a "mischievous" lie, while the sin of lying is diminished if it be directed to some good--either of pleasure and then it is a "jocose" lie, or of usefulness, and then we have the "officious" lie, whereby it is intended to help another person, or to save him from being injured. On this way lies are divided into the three kinds aforesaid.
Thirdly, lies are divided in a more general way, with respect to their relation to some end, whether or not this increase or diminish their gravity: and in this way the division comprises eight kinds, as stated in the Second Objection. Here the first three kinds are contained under "mischievous" lies, which are either against God, and then we have the lie "in religious doctrine," or against man, and this either with the sole intention of injuring him, and then it is the second kind of lie, which "profits no one, and injures someone"; or with the intention of injuring one and at the same time profiting another, and this is the third kind of lie, "which profits one, and injures another." Of these the first is the most grievous, because sins against God are always more grievous, as stated above (I-II, 73, 3): and the second is more grievous than the third, since the latter's gravity is diminished by the intention of profiting another.
After these three, which aggravate the sin of lying, we have a fourth, which has its own measure of gravity without addition or diminution; and this is the lie which is told "out of mere lust of lying and deceiving." This proceeds from a habit, wherefore the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "the liar, when he lies from habit, delights in lying."
The four kinds that follow lessen the gravity of the sin of lying. For the fifth kind is the jocose lie, which is told "with a desire to please": and the remaining three are comprised under the officious lie, wherein something useful to another person is intended. This usefulness regards either external things, and then we have the sixth kind of lie, which "profits someone in saving his money"; or his body, and this is the seventh kind, which "saves a man from death"; or the morality of his virtue, and this is the eighth kind, which "saves him from unlawful defilement of his body."
Now it is evident that the greater the good intended, the more is the sin of lying diminished in gravity. Wherefore a careful consideration of the matter will show that these various kinds of lies are enumerated in their order of gravity: since the useful good is better than the pleasurable good, and life of the body than money, and virtue than the life of the body.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Article 3. Whether every lie is a sin?
Objection 1. It seems that not every lie is a sin. For it is evident that the evangelists did not sin in the writing of the Gospel. Yet they seem to have told something false: since their accounts of the words of Christ and of others often differ from one another: wherefore seemingly one of them must have given an untrue account. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 2. Further, no one is rewarded by God for sin. But the midwives of Egypt were rewarded by God for a lie, for it is stated that "God built them houses" (Exodus 1:21). Therefore a lie is not a sin.
Objection 3. Further, the deeds of holy men are related in Sacred Writ that they may be a model of human life. But we read of certain very holy men that they lied. Thus (Genesis 12 and 20) we are told that Abraham said of his wife that she was his sister. Jacob also lied when he said that he was Esau, and yet he received a blessing (Genesis 27:27-29). Again, Judith is commended (Judith 15:10-11) although she lied to Holofernes. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
반대 3. 더구나, 거룩한 사람들의 행위는 성경 본문에 있어 그들이 인간의 삶에 대한 어떤 모범(a model)일 수도 있다고 말해집니다(are related). 그러나 우리는 특정한 거룩한 사람들에 대하여 그들이 거짓말을 하였음을 읽습니다. 따라서 (창세기 12와 20) 우리는 아브라함(Abraham)이 자신의 아내에 대하여 그녀가 자신의 누이라고 말하였다고 듣게 됩니다. 야곱(Jacob)은 또한 자신이 에사우(Esau)라고 말하고, 그리하여 그럼에도 불구하고 그가 한 개의 축복을 받을 때에, 거짓말을 하였습니다 (창세기 27,27-29). 또다시, 유딧(Judith)은, 비록 그녀가 홀로페르네스(Holofernes)에게 거짓말을 하였음에도 불구하고, 칭찬받게 됩니다 (유딧 15,10-11). 그러므로 모든 거짓말이 어떤 죄인 것은 아닙니다.
Objection 4. Further, one ought to choose the lesser evil in order to avoid the greater: even so a physician cuts off a limb, lest the whole body perish. Yet less harm is done by raising a false opinion in a person's mind, than by someone slaying or being slain. Therefore a man may lawfully lie, to save another from committing murder, or another from being killed.
Objection 5. Further, it is a lie not to fulfill what one has promised. Yet one is not bound to keep all one's promises: for Isidore says (Synonym. ii): "Break your faith when you have promised ill." Therefore not every lie is a sin.
Objection 6. Further, apparently a lie is a sin because thereby we deceive our neighbor: wherefore Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xxi): "Whoever thinks that there is any kind of lie that is not a sin deceives himself shamefully, since he deems himself an honest man when he deceives others." Yet not every lie is a cause of deception, since no one is deceived by a jocose lie; seeing that lies of this kind are told, not with the intention of being believed, but merely for the sake of giving pleasure. Hence again we find hyperbolical expressions in Holy Writ. Therefore not every lie is a sin.
On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 7:14): "Be not willing to make any manner of lie."
I answer that, An action that is naturally evil in respect of its genus can by no means be good and lawful, since in order for an action to be good it must be right in every respect: because good results from a complete cause, while evil results from any single defect, as Dionysius asserts (Div. Nom. iv). Now a lie is evil in respect of its genus, since it is an action bearing on undue matter. For as words are naturally signs of intellectual acts, it is unnatural and undue for anyone to signify by words something that is not in his mind. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 7) that "lying is in itself evil and to be shunned, while truthfulness is good and worthy of praise." Therefore every lie is a sin, as also Augustine declares (Contra Mend. i).
Reply to Objection 1. It is unlawful to hold that any false assertion is contained either in the Gospel or in any canonical Scripture, or that the writers thereof have told untruths, because faith would be deprived of its certitude which is based on the authority of Holy Writ. That the words of certain people are variously reported in the Gospel and other sacred writings does not constitute a lie. Hence Augustine says (De Consens. Evang. ii): "He that has the wit to understand that in order to know the truth it is necessary to get at the sense, will conclude that he must not be the least troubled, no matter by what words that sense is expressed." Hence it is evident, as he adds (De Consens. Evang. ii), that "we must not judge that someone is lying, if several persons fail to describe in the same way and in the same words a thing which they remember to have seen or heard."
Reply to Objection 2. The midwives were rewarded, not for their lie, but for their fear of God, and for their good-will, which latter led them to tell a lie. Hence it is expressly stated (Exodus 2:21): "And because the midwives feared God, He built them houses." But the subsequent lie was not meritorious.
Reply to Objection 3. In Holy Writ, as Augustine observes (Lib. De Mend. v), the deeds of certain persons are related as examples of perfect virtue: and we must not believe that such persons were liars. If, however, any of their statements appear to be untruthful, we must understand such statements to have been figurative and prophetic. Hence Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v): "We must believe that whatever is related of those who, in prophetical times, are mentioned as being worthy of credit, was done and said by them prophetically." As to Abraham "when he said that Sara was his sister, he wished to hide the truth, not to tell a lie, for she is called his sister since she was the daughter of his father," Augustine says (QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). Wherefore Abraham himself said (Genesis 20:12): "She is truly my sister, the daughter of my father, and not the daughter of my mother," being related to him on his father's side. Jacob's assertion that he was Esau, Isaac's first-born, was spoken in a mystical sense, because, to wit, the latter's birthright was due to him by right: and he made use of this mode of speech being moved by the spirit of prophecy, in order to signify a mystery, namely, that the younger people, i.e. the Gentiles, should supplant the first-born, i.e. the Jews.
반대 3에 대한 답변. 성경 본문에 있어, 아우구스티노(Augustine, 354-430년)가 목격하듯이(observes) [거짓말하는 것에 대하여(Lib. De Mend.) v(<----- 혹시 관심이 더 있으면, 클릭하여 읽도록 하십시오)], 특정한 인격들의 행위(deeds)들이 완미한 덕(perfect virtue)의 예(examples)들로서 이야기되고 있으며, 그래서(and) 우리는 그러한 인격들이 거짓말장이였다고 생각하지(believe) 말아야 합니다. 그러나, 만약에 그들의 진술(statements)들 중의 어느 것이 정직하지 않다면(untruthful), 우리는 그러한 진술들이 비유적이었을(figurative) 것이고 그리고 예언적이었을(prophetic) 것이라고 이해하여야만 합니다. 따라서 아우구스티노(Augustine)는 다음과 같이 말합니다 [거짓말하는 것에 대하여(Lib. De Mend.) v(<----- 혹시 관심이 더 있으면, 클릭하여 읽도록 하십시오)]: "우리는, 예언의 시기(prophetical times) 있어, 인정(credit)을 마땅히 받을 만한 자들로서 언급되고 있는 자들에 대하여 관련되어 있는 것 무엇이든지 그들에 의하여 예언적으로 행하여졌고 그리고 말해졌음을 믿어야만 한다." 아브라함(Abraham)의 경우에 있어 "사라(Sara)가 자신의 누이였다고 그가 말하였을 때에, 그는 진실을 감추는 것(to hide the truth)을 바랐던 것이지(wished), 어떤 거짓말을 하는 것(to tell a lie)을 바랐던 것이 아니었는데, 이는 그녀가 그의 아버지의 딸이었기 때문에 그의 누이라고 불리고 있기 때문이다" 라고 아우구스티노는 말합니다(QQ. Super. Gen. xxvi; Contra Mend. x; Contra Faust. xxii). 그런 이유로 아브라함 스스로 다음과 같이 (창세기 20,12) 말하였으며: "더구나 그 여자는 정말 나의 누이입니다. 아버지는 같고 어머니가 달라서 내 아내가 되었습니다," 그 결과 [사라는] 자신의 아버지측으로 그에게 친척 관계였습니다, 자신이, 이사악(Isaac)의 첫 번째 아들인, 에사우(Esau)라는 야곱(Jocob)의 단언(assertion)은 어떤 신비적 어의/의미(a mystical sense)(*) 안에서 말해졌는데, 왜냐하면, 즉(to wit), 에사우의 장자 상속권이 정당하게(by right) 자신에게 돌려져야 하였기 때문이며, 그리하여, 한 개의 신비를, 다시 말해서, 더 어린 백성, 즉 이방인들이, 맏배, 즉 유다인들을 대체하여야만(should supplant) 한다는 한 개의 신비(a mystery)를, 예시(豫示)하기(signify) 위하여, 예언의 영(the spirit of prophecy)에 의하여 움직여지는 말하기(speech)의 바로 그러한 양식(mode)을 그가 사용하였습니다.
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(*) 번역자 주: 여기서 "a mystical sense"를 "어떤 신비적 어의/의미"로 번역하였는데, 이것은, 1992년에 초판 발행된 "가톨릭 교회 교리서" 본문에서 또한 가르치고 있는, 가톨릭 교회의 대단히 오래된 네 방식의 성경 해석법들 중의 한 가지이다. 이에 대한 더 자세한 내용은 다음의 글의 제2항에 있으니 필독하라:
http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1077.htm
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Some, however, are commended in the Scriptures, not on account of perfect virtue, but for a certain virtuous disposition, seeing that it was owing to some praiseworthy sentiment that they were moved to do certain undue things. It is thus that Judith is praised, not for lying to Holofernes, but for her desire to save the people, to which end she exposed herself to danger. And yet one might also say that her words contain truth in some mystical sense.
그러나 성경 본문에 있어 어떤 이들은, 그들이 특정한(certain) 부당한 일들을 하도록 움직여진 것이, 어떠한 칭찬할 만한 정서(sentiment) 때문이었음을 고려할 때에, 완미한 덕(perfect virtue)(**) 때문이 아니라, 어떤, 특정한 덕이 있는, 성향(a certin virtuous disposition) 때문에, 칭찬을 받게 됩니다. 유딧(Judith)이 칭찬받는 것이, 홀로페르네스(Holofernes)에게 거짓말을 하였기 때문이 아니라, 백성을 구히고자 하는 그녀의 욕망 때문에, 바로 그 목적 때문에 그녀가 자기 자신을 위험에 노출시켰던, 바로 그러한 방식(thus) 입니다.
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(**) 번역자 주: 번역 용어들인 "완미한(perfect)" 과 "완전한(complete)" 이라는 두 개의 형용사들이 나타내는 의미 혹은 개념들에 있어서의 커다란 차이점에 대한 글은 다음에 있으니 필독하라:
http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1094.htm
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Reply to Objection 4. A lie is sinful not only because it injures one's neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms, except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).
Reply to Objection 5. A man does not lie, so long as he has a mind to do what he promises, because he does not speak contrary to what he has in mind: but if he does not keep his promise, he seems to act without faith in changing his mind. He may, however, be excused for two reasons. First, if he has promised something evidently unlawful, because he sinned in promise, and did well to change his mind. Secondly, if circumstances have changed with regard to persons and the business in hand. For, as Seneca states (De Benef. iv), for a man to be bound to keep a promise, it is necessary for everything to remain unchanged: otherwise neither did he lie in promising--since he promised what he had in his mind, due circumstances being taken for granted--nor was he faithless in not keeping his promise, because circumstances are no longer the same. Hence the Apostle, though he did not go to Corinth, whither he had promised to go (2 Corinthians 1), did not lie, because obstacles had arisen which prevented him.
Reply to Objection 6. An action may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, secondly, with regard to the agent. Accordingly a jocose lie, from the very genus of the action, is of a nature to deceive; although in the intention of the speaker it is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way it is told. Nor is there any similarity in the hyperbolical or any kind of figurative expressions, with which we meet in Holy Writ: because, as Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. v), "it is not a lie to do or say a thing figuratively: because every statement must be referred to the thing stated: and when a thing is done or said figuratively, it states what those to whom it is tendered understand it to signify."
Article 4. Whether every lie is a mortal sin?
Objection 1. It seems that every lie is a mortal sin. For it is written (Psalm 6:7): "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie," and (Wisdom 1:11): "The mouth that belieth killeth the soul." Now mortal sin alone causes destruction and death of the soul. Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 2. Further, whatever is against a precept of the decalogue is a mortal sin. Now lying is against this precept of the decalogue: "Thou shalt not bear false witness." Therefore every lie is a mortal sin.
Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 36): "Every liar breaks his faith in lying, since forsooth he wishes the person to whom he lies to have faith in him, and yet he does not keep faith with him, when he lies to him: and whoever breaks his faith is guilty of iniquity." Now no one is said to break his faith or "to be guilty of iniquity," for a venial sin. Therefore no lie is a venial sin.
Objection 4. Further, the eternal reward is not lost save for a mortal sin. Now, for a lie the eternal reward was lost, being exchanged for a temporal meed. For Gregory says (Moral. xviii) that "we learn from the reward of the midwives what the sin of lying deserves: since the reward which they deserved for their kindness, and which they might have received in eternal life, dwindled into a temporal meed on account of the lie of which they were guilty." Therefore even an officious lie, such as was that of the midwives, which seemingly is the least of lies, is a mortal sin.
Objection 5. Further, Augustine says (Lib. De Mend. xvii) that "it is a precept of perfection, not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie." Now it is a mortal sin to act against a precept. Therefore every lie of the perfect is a mortal sin: and consequently so also is a lie told by anyone else, otherwise the perfect would be worse off than others.
On the contrary, Augustine says on Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy," etc.: "There are two kinds of lie, that are not grievously sinful yet are not devoid of sin, when we lie either in joking, or for the sake of our neighbor's good." But every mortal sin is grievous. Therefore jocose and officious lies are not mortal sins.
I answer that, A mortal sin is, properly speaking, one that is contrary to charity whereby the soul lives in union with God, as stated above (24, 12; 35, 3). Now a lie may be contrary to charity in three ways: first, in itself; secondly, in respect of the evil intended; thirdly, accidentally.
A lie may be in itself contrary to charity by reason of its false signification. For if this be about divine things, it is contrary to the charity of God, whose truth one hides or corrupts by such a lie; so that a lie of this kind is opposed not only to the virtue of charity, but also to the virtues of faith and religion: wherefore it is a most grievous and a mortal sin. If, however, the false signification be about something the knowledge of which affects a man's good, for instance if it pertain to the perfection of science or to moral conduct, a lie of this description inflicts an injury on one's neighbor, since it causes him to have a false opinion, wherefore it is contrary to charity, as regards the love of our neighbor, and consequently is a mortal sin. On the other hand, if the false opinion engendered by the lie be about some matter the knowledge of which is of no consequence, then the lie in question does no harm to one's neighbor; for instance, if a person be deceived as to some contingent particulars that do not concern him. Wherefore a lie of this kind, considered in itself, is not a mortal sin.
As regards the end in view, a lie may be contrary to charity, through being told with the purpose of injuring God, and this is always a mortal sin, for it is opposed to religion; or in order to injure one's neighbor, in his person, his possessions or his good name, and this also is a mortal sin, since it is a mortal sin to injure one's neighbor, and one sins mortally if one has merely the intention of committing a mortal sin. But if the end intended be not contrary to charity, neither will the lie, considered under this aspect, be a mortal sin, as in the case of a jocose lie, where some little pleasure is intended, or in an officious lie, where the good also of one's neighbor is intended. Accidentally a lie may be contrary to charity by reason of scandal or any other injury resulting therefrom: and thus again it will be a mortal sin, for instance if a man were not deterred through scandal from lying publicly.
Reply to Objection 1. The passages quoted refer to the mischievous lie, as a gloss explains the words of Psalm 5:7, "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie."
Reply to Objection 2. Since all the precepts of the decalogue are directed to the love of God and our neighbor, as stated above (44, 1, ad 3; I-II, 100, 5, ad 1), a lie is contrary to a precept of the decalogue, in so far as it is contrary to the love of God and our neighbor. Hence it is expressly forbidden to bear false witness against our neighbor.
Reply to Objection 3. Even a venial sin can be called "iniquity" in a broad sense, in so far as it is beside the equity of justice; wherefore it is written (1 John 3:4): "Every sin is iniquity [Vulgate: 'And sin is iniquity.']." It is in this sense that Augustine is speaking.
Reply to Objection 4. The lie of the midwives may be considered in two ways. First as regards their feeling of kindliness towards the Jews, and their reverence and fear of God, for which their virtuous disposition is commended. For this an eternal reward is due. Wherefore Jerome (in his exposition of Isaiah 65:21, 'And they shall build houses') explains that God "built them spiritual houses." Secondly, it may be considered with regard to the external act of lying. For thereby they could merit, not indeed eternal reward, but perhaps some temporal meed, the deserving of which was not inconsistent with the deformity of their lie, though this was inconsistent with their meriting an eternal reward. It is in this sense that we must understand the words of Gregory, and not that they merited by that lie to lose the eternal reward as though they had already merited it by their preceding kindliness, as the objection understands the words to mean.
Reply to Objection 5. Some say that for the perfect every lie is a mortal sin. But this assertion is unreasonable. For no circumstance causes a sin to be infinitely more grievous unless it transfers it to another species. Now a circumstance of person does not transfer a sin to another species, except perhaps by reason of something annexed to that person, for instance if it be against his vow: and this cannot apply to an officious or jocose lie. Wherefore an officious or a jocose lie is not a mortal sin in perfect men, except perhaps accidentally on account of scandal. We may take in this sense the saying of Augustine that "it is a precept of perfection not only not to lie at all, but not even to wish to lie": although Augustine says this not positively but dubiously, for he begins by saying: "Unless perhaps it is a precept," etc. Nor does it matter that they are placed in a position to safeguard the truth: because they are bound to safeguard the truth by virtue of their office in judging or teaching, and if they lie in these matters their lie will be a mortal sin: but it does not follow that they sin mortally when they lie in other matters.
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번역자: 교수 소순태 마태오 (Ph.D.)
