가톨릭 신앙생활 Q&A 코너
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[꼭필독] '과도하다'(inordinate)의 정의(definition); 죄의 원인으로서 감각들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 욕구들 [Ia IIae q77 신학대전여행 및 신학대전] |
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2024-11-15 ㅣ No.3777 게시자 주: (1) 본글의 인터넷 주소, http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/3777.htm 에 접속하면, 본글 중에서 제시되고 있는 출처 문헌들을 쉽게 확인할 수 있습니다. 그리고 다음의 인터넷 주소, http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/q&a.htm 에 접속하면, 본글의 제목이 포함된, "가톨릭 신앙생활 Q&A 코너" 제공의 모든 게시글들의 제목들의 목록을 가질 수 있습니다. 또한 (i) 2006년 12월 16일에 개시(開始)하여 제공 중인 미국 천주교 주교회의/중앙협의회 홈페이지 제공의 날마다 영어 매일미사 중의 독서들 듣고 보기, 그리고 (ii) 신뢰할 수 있는 가톨릭 라틴어/프랑스어/영어 문서들 등은, 다음의 주소들에 접속하면, 손쉽게 접근할 수 있습니다: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/ (PC용, 날마다 자동으로 듣고 봄) [주: 즐겨찾기에 추가하십시오]; http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/m (스마트폰용) [주: 네이버 혹은 구글 검색창 위에 있는 인터넷 주소창에 이 주소 입력 후 꼭 북마크 하십시오] _2303 [내용 추가 일자: 2024-11-17] (2) 본글은, 다음의 주소들에 접속하면 학습할 수 있는 졸고들에 이어지는 글입니다. 필독을 권고드립니다: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1675.htm <----- 필독 권고 [제목: 다른 죄의 원인으로서 하나의 죄(one sin) [Ia IIae q84 신학대전여행 및 신학대전]; 게시일자: 2016-02-02] http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/weakness_2297.htm <----- 필청/필독 권고 [제목: 부제: 나약함(weakness)과 약점의 커다란 차이점에 대하여; 게시일자: 2021-10-30] http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/2298.htm <----- 필독 권고 [제목: 2코린토 12,9; 히브리 5,2; 히브리 7,28에서 약점 으로 번역된 표현은, 모두 나약함(weakness) 으로 번역되어야 할 것이다; 게시일자: 2021-10-30]
(3) 다음의 주소에 접속하면, 전혀 예상밖으로, 그리스도교 전통적 교의 신학, 윤리 신학, 영성 신학 용어인 'inordinate'라는 형용사의 정의(definition)가 Hardon 신부님의 "Modern Catholic Dictionary"에 표제어로 수록되어 있지 않음을 확인할 수 있습니다: http://www.therealpresence.org/dictionary/idict.htm <----- 꼭 확인 권고
(4) 다음에 발췌된 바는, 아래의 신학대전 Ia IIae, q77, 제3조에 주어진, 그리스도교 전통적 교의 신학, 윤리 신학, 영성 신학 용어인 'inordinate'라는 형용사의 정의(definition)입니다:
출처: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/영혼의_부분들이_과도하다(inordinate)의_정의(definition)_3777r.htm [주: 아래의 신학대전 Ia IIae, q77, 제3조] (발췌 시작) [영혼의 부분들이] 과도하다(inordinate) [시림의] 몸(body)의 부분들이, 그들이 자연의 질서(the order of nature) 쪽으로 따름(to comply with)에 실패할 때에, 질서로부터 벗어났다/무질서하다(be out of order)라고 말해지듯이, 또한 마찬가지로 [시림의] 영혼(the soul)[즉, 혼]의 부분들(partium animae)은, 그들이 이성의 질서(the order of reason)에 종속하지 않을(not subject to) 때에, 과도하다(inordinate)라고 말해집니다. 이는 이성(reason)이 영혼[즉, 혼](the soul)의 부분들(partium animae)에 대한 통제하는/지배하는 힘(the ruling/governing(regitiva, rego; to keep straight or from going wrong) power of the soul's parts)이기(*3) 때문입니다. (이상, '과도하다'(inordinate)라는 용어의 정의(definition) 끝) (이상, 발췌 끝) [이상, 2024-11-17일자 내용 추가 끝]
부제(副題) 1: 온갖 죄(every sin)는 과도한 나르시시즘/자아도취증(inordinate narcissism/self-love)의 열매(fruit)이다 [주: 아래의 신학대전 Ia IIae, q77, 제4조] 링크 주소 1: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/온갖_죄는_과도한_나르시시즘(inordinate_narcissism)의_열매이다_3777r.htm
부제(副題) 2: 과도한 나르시시즘/자아도취증(inordinate narcissism/self-love)은 온갖 죄(every sin)를 산출한다(produces) [주: 아래의 신학대전 Ia IIae, q77, 제4조] 링크 주소 2: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/과도한_나르시시즘(inordinate_narcissism)은_온갖_죄를_산출한다_3777r.htm
번역자 주 : 다음은, 성 토마스 아퀴나스의 "신학 대전"의 약 600여 개에 달하는 각 문항(Questions)들에 대한 "압축된 바꾸어 말하기"인 Paul J. Glenn 몬시뇰(1893-1957)의 저서: "A Tour of the Summa(신학대전여행)"의 Ia IIae, q77 the Sensitive Appetites as the Cause of Sin [죄의 원인으로서 감각들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 욕구들] 전문이며, 그리고 하반부의 글은, 상반부의 글에 대응하는 성 토마스 아퀴나스의 신학 대전, Ia IIae, q77 the Sensitive Appetites as the Cause of Sin [죄의 원인으로서 감각들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 욕구들] 영어본 전문이다. 초벌 번역 일자: 2012년 9월 29일 번역자: 교수 소순태 마태오 (Ph.D.) 우리말 번역문 출처: http://club.catholic.or.kr/tourofsumma 본글로의 접속 주소: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/3777.htm
출처: http://www.catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-paeat2A.php?q=500
77. the Sensitive Appetites as the Cause of Sin
77. 죄의 원인으로서 감각들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 욕구들 1. Sense-passion or appetite cannot directly move the will to sin, but it can work indirectly upon the will. For the judgment of reason sometimes follows sense-tendency, and the will's choice follows this judgment.
1. 감각-정(情)(sense-passion) 혹은 욕구(appetite)는 의지를 죄(sin) 쪽으로 직접적으로 움직일 수 없으나, 그러나 이것은 의지에 간접적으로 작용할 수 있습니다. 이는 이성의 판단이 때로는 감각-성향(sense-tendency)을 뒤따르며, 그리하여 의지의 선택이 바로 이 판단을 뒤따르기 때문입니다. 2. When passion is so intense that a person loses the
use of reason, the consequent act is not a human act at all, and the person who
performs the act is guilty only in so far as he knowingly permitted the wild
passion to take hold on him. But, short of this insane excess, a person is
responsible for his act, although this responsibility is lessened by high
passion. It is possible for a person, in responsible acts performed under stress
of passion, to allow reason to be so strongly swayed that he acts against his
knowledge of what is right and sane. Thus a man, in an outburst of wild temper,
will say and do things that he knows "at the very moment" are futile and
foolish. And a man, well aware of a truth, may, through passion, fail to
recognize or apply it in a particular case, and thus may deny what he really
knows to be true.
3. Therefore, a sin committed through passion is a sin
of weakness. As the body is weak because of disorder in its parts, so the soul
is weak when passion disorders the right rule of reason.
5. The influences which bear upon reason to induce it
to sin are rightly set forth in sacred scripture (i john 2:16) as follows: (a)
the concupiscence of the flesh, that is, passionate desire for bodily delights;
(b) the concupiscence of the eyes, that is, inordinate desire for wealth and
temporal goods; (c) pride of life, that is, the soul's hunger for honors,
praise, and power to rule.
6. Passion that precedes sin (that is, antecedent
passion) not only brings urgency upon the will, but also obscures the
judgment of the thinking mind that guides the will; hence, antecedent passion
diminishes sin. But consequent passion, that is, passion stirred up by
the will itself (as in one who deliberately works himself into a rage, or nerves
himself to do an evil thing) rather increases a sin than diminishes it, for such
passion shows the intensity of the will's determination to sin.
7. Passion so great as to destroy free choice excuses
from sin. But if this great passion comes from the will's faulty neglect to
prevent it, it does not wholly excuse from sin.
8. In serious matters sins committed through passion,
even through passion that diminishes responsibility, are mortal sins. For as
long as passion does not render a man temporarily insane, it can be allayed. A
man can work to banish the passionate urge, and can prevent it from having its
sinful effect. If he fails to do this, he sins, and, in serious matters, he sins
mortally.
============================== 출처 1: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2077.htm
신학 대전 Ia IIae
Question 77. The cause of sin, on the part of the sensitive appetite We must now consider the cause
of sin, on the part of the sensitive
우리는 이제 죄의 원인에 대하여, 감각들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 욕구의 측에 있어, 영혼의 어떤 정(情, passion)이 죄의 한 개의 원인일 수도 있는지에 관하여, 고찰하여야 하며, 그리고 이러한 표제 아래에서 질문에 있어서의 여덟 개의 요지들이 다음과 같이 있습니다:
1. Can a passion of the
sensitive appetite move or incline the will?
Article 1. Whether the will
is moved by a passion of the senstive
appetite?
Objection 2. Further, the higher mover is not moved by the lower; thus the soul is not moved by the body. Now the will, which is the rational appetite, is compared to the sensitive appetite, as a higher mover to a lower: for the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 57) that "the rational appetite moves the sensitive appetite, even as, in the heavenly bodies, one sphere moves another." Therefore the will cannot be moved by a passion of the sensitive appetite.
Objection 3. Further,
nothing immaterial can be moved by that which is material. Now the will is an
immaterial power, because it does not use a corporeal organ, since it is in the
reason, as stated in De Anima iii, text. 42: whereas the sensitive appetite is a
material force, since it is seated in an organ of the body. Therefore a passion
of the sensitive appetite cannot move the intellective
appetite.
On the contrary, It is
written (Daniel 13:56): "Lust hath perverted thy
heart."
I answer that, A
passion of the sensitive appetite cannot draw or move the will directly; but it
can do so indirectly, and this in two ways. First, by a kind of distraction:
because, since all the soul's powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul,
it follows of necessity that, when one power is intent in its act, another power
becomes remiss, or is even altogether impeded, in its act, both because all
energy is weakened through being divided, so that, on the contrary, through
being centered on one thing, it is less able to be directed to several; and
because, in the operations of the soul, a certain attention is requisite, and if
this be closely fixed on one thing, less attention is given to another. In this
way, by a kind of distraction, when the movement of the sensitive appetite is
enforced in respect of any passion whatever, the proper movement of the rational
appetite or will must, of necessity, become remiss or altogether
impeded.
Secondly, this may happen on the part
of the will's object, which is good apprehended by reason. Because the judgment
and apprehension of reason is impeded on account of a vehement and inordinate
apprehension of the imagination and judgment of the estimative power, as appears
in those who are out of their mind. Now it is evident that the apprehension of
the imagination and the judgment of the estimative power follow the passion of
the sensitive appetite, even as the verdict of the taste follows the disposition
of the tongue: for which reason we observe that those who are in some kind of
passion, do not easily turn their imagination away from the object of their
emotion, the result being that the judgment of the reason often follows the
passion of the sensitive appetite, and consequently the will's movement follows
it also, since it has a natural inclination always to follow the judgment of the
reason.
Reply to Objection 1.
Although the passion of the sensitive appetite is not the direct object of the
will, yet it occasions a certain change in the judgment about the object of the
will, as stated.
Reply to Objection 2.
The higher mover is not directly moved by the lower; but, in a manner, it can be
moved by it indirectly, as stated.
The Third Objection is
solved in like manner.
Article 2. Whether the
reason can be overcome by a passion, against its
knowledge?
Objection 1. It would
seem that the reason cannot be overcome by a passion, against its knowledge. For
the stronger is not overcome by the weaker. Now knowledge, on account of its
certitude, is the strongest thing in us. Therefore it cannot be overcome by a
passion, which is weak and soon passes away.
Objection 2. Further,
the will is not directed save to the good or the apparent good. Now when a
passion draws the will to that which is really good, it does not influence the
reason against its knowledge; and when it draws it to that which is good
apparently, but not really, it draws it to that which appears good to the
reason. But what appears to the reason is in the knowledge of the reason.
Therefore a passion never influences the reason against its
knowledge.
Objection 3. Further,
if it be said that it draws the reason from its knowledge of something in
general, to form a contrary judgment about a particular matter—on the contrary,
if a universal and a particular proposition be opposed, they are opposed by
contradiction, e.g. "Every man," and "Not every man." Now if two opinions
contradict one another, they are contrary to one another, as stated in Peri
Herm. ii. If therefore anyone, while knowing something in general, were to
pronounce an opposite judgment in a particular case, he would have two contrary
opinions at the same time, which is impossible.
Objection 4. Further,
whoever knows the universal, knows also the particular which he knows to be
contained in the universal: thus who knows that every mule is sterile, knows
that this particular animal is sterile, provided he knows it to be a mule, as is
clear from Poster. i, text. 2. Now he who knows something in general, e.g. that
"no fornication is lawful," knows this general proposition to contain, for
example, the particular proposition, "This is an act of fornication." Therefore
it seems that his knowledge extends to the
particular. Objection 5. Further, according to the Philosopher (Peri Herm. i), "words express the thoughts of the mind." Now it often happens that man, while in a state of passion, confesses that what he has chosen is an evil, even in that particular case. Therefore he has knowledge, even in particular. Therefore it seems that the passions cannot draw the reason against its universal knowledge; because it is impossible for it to have universal knowledge together with an opposite particular judgment. On the contrary, The Apostle says (Romans 7:23): "I see another law in my members, fighting against the law of my mind, and captivating me in the law of sin." Now the law that is in the members is concupiscence, of which he had been speaking previously. Since then concupiscence is a passion, it seems that a passion draws the reason counter to its knowledge. I answer that, As the Philosopher states (Ethic. vii, 2), the opinion of Socrates was that knowledge can never be overcome by passion; wherefore he held every virtue to be a kind of knowledge, and every sin a kind of ignorance. In this he was somewhat right, because, since the object of the will is a good or an apparent good, it is never moved to an evil, unless that which is not good appear good in some respect to the reason; so that the will would never tend to evil, unless there were ignorance or error in the reason. Hence it is written (Proverbs 14:22): "They err that work evil." Experience, however, shows that many act contrary to the knowledge that they have, and this is confirmed by Divine authority, according to the words of Luke 12:47: "The servant who knew that the will of his lord . . . and did not . . . shall be beaten with many stripes," and of James 4:17: "To him . . . who knoweth to do good, and doth it not, to him it is a sin." Consequently he was not altogether right, and it is necessary, with the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 3) to make a distinction. Because, since man is directed to right action by a twofold knowledge, viz. universal and particular, a defect in either of them suffices to hinder the rectitude of the will and of the deed, as stated above (I-II:76:1). It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no fornication is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is fornication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the universal knowledge of the reason. Again, it must be observed that nothing prevents a thing which is known habitually from not being considered actually: so that it is possible for a man to have correct knowledge not only in general but also in particular, and yet not to consider his knowledge actually: and in such a case it does not seem difficult for a man to act counter to what he does not actually consider. Now, that a man sometimes fails to consider in particular what he knows habitually, may happen through mere lack of attention: for instance, a man who knows geometry, may not attend to the consideration of geometrical conclusions, which he is ready to consider at any moment. Sometimes man fails to consider actually what he knows habitually, on account of some hindrance supervening, e.g. some external occupation, or some bodily infirmity; and, in this way, a man who is in a state of passion, fails to consider in particular what he knows in general, in so far as the passions hinder him from considering it. Now it hinders him in three ways. First, by way of distraction, as explained above (Article 1). Secondly, by way of opposition, because a passion often inclines to something contrary to what man knows in general. Thirdly, by way of bodily transmutation (corporali transmutatione),[예를 들어, 분노(wrath)에서처럼, 시각적으로, 촉각적으로 등의 감각적으로 불쾌하게 됨을 경유하여 이성의 판단력이 흐려지게 되는 경우; 슬픔(sorrow)에서처럼, 눈물을 흘리게 됨을 경유하여 이성의 판단력이 흐려지게 되는 경우 등] the result of which is that the reason is somehow fettered so as not to exercise its act freely; even as sleep or drunkenness, on account of some change wrought on the body, fetters the use of reason. That this takes place in the passions is evident from the fact that sometimes, when the passions are very intense, man loses the use of reason altogether: for many have gone out of their minds through excess of love or anger. It is in this way that passion draws the reason to judge in particular, against the knowledge which it has in general. Reply to Objection 1. Universal knowledge, which is most certain, does not hold the foremost place in action, but rather particular knowledge, since actions are about singulars: wherefore it is not astonishing that, in matters of action, passion acts counter to universal knowledge, if the consideration of particular knowledge be lacking. Reply to Objection 2. The fact that something appears good in particular to the reason, whereas it is not good, is due to a passion: and yet this particular judgment is contrary to the universal knowledge of the reason. Reply to Objection 3. It is impossible for anyone to have an actual knowledge or true opinion about a universal affirmative proposition, and at the same time a false opinion about a particular negative proposition, or vice versa: but it may well happen that a man has true habitual knowledge about a universal affirmative proposition, and actually a false opinion about a particular negative: because an act is directly opposed, not to a habit, but to an act. Reply to Objection 4. He that has knowledge in a universal, is hindered, on account of a passion, from reasoning about that universal, so as to draw the conclusion: but he reasons about another universal proposition suggested by the inclination of the passion, and draws his conclusion accordingly. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that the syllogism of an incontinent man has four propositions, two particular and two universal, of which one is of the reason, e.g. No fornication is lawful, and the other, of passion, e.g. Pleasure is to be pursued. Hence passion fetters the reason, and hinders it from arguing and concluding under the first proposition; so that while the passions lasts, the reason argues and concludes under the second. Reply to Objection 5. Even as a drunken man sometimes gives utterance to words of deep signification, of which, however, he is incompetent to judge, his drunkenness hindering him; so that a man who is in a state of passion, may indeed say in words that he ought not to do so and so, yet his inner thought is that he must do it, as stated in Ethic. vii, 3. Article 3. Whether a sin committed through passion, should be called a sin of weakness? 제3조. 정(情, passion)을 통하여 범해진 한 개의 죄는 나약함(weakness)에 기인하는 한 개의 죄이라고 마땅히 불리어야 하는지? [링크 주소 1: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/rational_soul_3777r.htm (클릭하지 마십시오)] [링크 주소 2: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/나약함(weakness)의_정의(definition)_3777r.htm (클릭하지 마십시오)] Objection 1. It would seem that a sin committed through passion should not be called a sin of weakness. For a passion is a vehement movement of the sensitive appetite, as stated above (Article 1). Now vehemence of movements is evidence of strength rather than of weakness. Therefore a sin committed through passion, should not be called a sin of weakness. Objection 2. Further, weakness in man regards that which is most fragile in him. Now this is the flesh; whence it is written (Psalm 77:39): "He remembered that they are flesh." Therefore sins of weakness should be those which result from bodily defects, rather than those which are due to a passion. Objection 3. Further, man does not seem to be weak in respect of things which are subject to his will. Now it is subject to man's will, whether he do or do not the things to which his passions incline him, according to Genesis 4:7: "Thy appetite shall be under thee [Vulgate: 'The lust thereof shall be under thee.'], and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore sin committed through passion is not a sin of weakness. On the contrary, Cicero (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) calls the passions diseases of the soul. Now weakness is another name for disease. Therefore a sin that arises from passion should be called a sin of weakness. 이와는 달리, 키케로는 (De Quaest. Tusc. iv) 정(情, passions)들을 영혼의 병(diseases)들이라고 부릅니다. 그런데(Now) 나약함(weeakness)은 병(disease)의 또다른 이름입니다. 그러므로 정(情, passion)으로부터 일어나는 한 개의 죄(a sin)는 나약햠에 기인하는 한 개의 죄(a sin of weakness)이라고 마땅히 불리어야 합니다. I answer that, The cause of sin is on the part of the soul, in which, chiefly, sin resides. Now weakness may be applied to the soul by way of likeness to weakness of the body. Accordingly, man's body is said to be weak, when it is disabled or hindered in the execution of its proper action, through some disorder of the body's parts, so that the humors and members of the human body cease to be subject to its governing and motive power. Hence a member is said to be weak, when it cannot do the work of a healthy member, the eye, for instance, when it cannot see clearly, as the Philosopher states (De Hist. Animal. x, 1). Therefore weakness of the soul is when the soul is hindered from fulfilling its proper action on account of a disorder in its parts. Now as the parts of the body are said to be out of order, when they fail to comply with the order of nature, so too the parts of the soul are said to be inordinate, when they are not subject to the order of reason, for the reason is the ruling power of the soul's parts. Accordingly, when the concupiscible or irascible power is affected by any passion contrary to the order of reason, the result being that an impediment arises in the aforesaid manner to the due action of man, it is said to be a sin of weakness. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. vii, 8) compares the incontinent man to an epileptic, whose limbs move in a manner contrary to his intention. 저는 다음과 같이 답변합니다: 죄의 원인은, 그 안에, 주로, 죄가 거주하는, 이 영혼[즉, 혼](the soul)의 바로 그 부분(parte animae)에 있습니다. 그런데 나약함(weakness)은 몸의 나약함에 비슷한 방식에 의하여 영혼에 적용될 수도 있습니다. 이에 따라, 사람의 몸은, 그것이 그 고유한 행동의 수행에 있어, 몸의 부분들의 어떠한 무질서(some disorder)를 통하여, 행할 수 없게 되거나 혹은 방해를 받게 되어 그리하여 그 결과 인간의 몸의 [네 종류의] 체액(humors)들 및 구성원들이 그 지배하는(governing) 및 동기가 되는(motive) 힘 쪽으로 복종하게 됨을 그만둘(cease) 때에, 나약하다(weak)라고 말해집니다. 따라서 [몸의] 한 개의 구성원은, 예를 들어, 철학자(De Hist. Animal. x, 1)[즉, 아리스토텔레스]가 눈(the eye)이 분명하게 볼 수 없을 때에 눈(the eye)이 그러하다고 서술하듯이, 그것이 한 개의 건강한 구성원의 일을 행할 수 없을 때에, 나약하다(weak)라고 말해집니다. 그러므로 영혼[즉, 혼]의 나약함(the weakness of the soul)(infirmitas animae)은 영혼[즉, 혼]이 그 부분들에 있는 어떤 무질서(a disorder) 때문에 그 고유한 행동을 구현함으로부터 방해를 받게 될 때를 말합니다.(*1) 그런데 [사람의] 몸(body)의 부분들이, 그들이 자연의 질서(the order of nature) 쪽으로 따름(to comply with)에 실패할 때에, 질서로부터 벗어났다/무질서하다(be out of order)라고 말해지듯이, 또한 마찬가지로 [사람의] 영혼(the soul)[즉, 혼]의 부분들(partium animae)은, 그들이 이성의 질서(the order of reason)에 종속하지 않을(not subject to) 때에, 과도하다(inordinate)라고 말해지는데,(*2) 이는 이성(reason)이 영혼[즉, 혼](the soul)의 부분들(partium animae)에 대한 통제하는/지배하는 힘(the ruling/governing(regitiva, rego; to keep straight or from going wrong) power of the soul's parts)이기(*3) 때문입니다. 따라서(Accordingly), 사욕[私慾, 이기적인 욕심, concupiscence, 즉, 사욕편정(私慾偏情)]에 의하여 동기가 부여되는(concupiscible) 혹은 분발(奮發)에 의하여 움직이게 되는(irascible) 힘은 이성의 질서(the order of reason)에 반(反)하는(contraty to) 임의의 정(情, passion)에 의하여 영향을 받게되어, 그 결과가 사람(man)의 합당한(due) 행동 쪽으로 이미 말해진(aforesaid) 방식으로 어떤 장애(impediment)가 일어날 때에, 이 장애는 나약함에 기인하는 한 개의 죄(a sin of weakness)이라고 말해집니다. 따라서 철학자 (Ethic. vii, 8)[즉, 아리스토텔레스]는 이 자제할 수 없는 사람(the incontinent man)을, 그 수족들이 자신의 의도(intention)에 반(反)하는(contrary to) 방식으로 움직이는, 한 명의 간질병 환자(epileptic) 쪽으로 비교합니다.
----- ,(*1) 번역자 주: (i) 바로 여기서, 'the weakness of the soul'(영혼의 나약함)의 정의(definition)가 주어지고 있다: 'the weakness of the soul'(영혼의 나약함) [몸의] 한 개의 구성원은, 예를 들어, 철학자(De Hist. Animal. x, 1)[즉, 아리스토텔레스]가 눈(the eye)이 분명하게 볼 수 없을 때에 눈(the eye)이 그러하다고 서술하듯이, 그것이 한 개의 건강한 구성원의 일을 행할 수 없을 때에, 나약하다(weak)라고 말해집니다. 그러므로 영혼[즉, 혼]의 나약함(the weakness of the soul)(infirmitas animae)은 영혼[즉, 혼]이 그 부분들에 있는 어떤 무질서(a disorder) 때문에 그 고유한 행동을 구현함으로부터 방해를 받게 될 때를 말합니다 (이상, '영혼의 나약함'(the weakness of the soul)의 정의(definition) 끝)
(ii) 그런데, 다음의 주소에 접속하면, 전혀 예상밖으로, 그리스도교 전통적 교의 신학, 윤리 신학, 영성 신학 용어인 'weak'/'weakness'라는 형용사/명사의 정의(definition)가 Hardon 신부님의 "Modern Catholic Dictionary"에 표제어로 수록되어 있지 않음을 확인할 수 있습니다: http://www.therealpresence.org/dictionary/wdict.htm <----- 꼭 확인 권고
그리고 이 문제는, 다음의 주소에 접속하면, 또한 전혀 예상밖으로, 그리스도교 전통적 교의 신학, 윤리 신학, 영성 신학 용어인 'inordinate'라는 형용사의 정의(definition)가 Hardon 신부님의 "Modern Catholic Dictionary"에 표제어로 수록되어 있지 않음을 확인할 수 있는 문제와 직접적으로 관련이 되어있다는 생각입니다: http://www.therealpresence.org/dictionary/idict.htm <----- 꼭 확인 권고
(*2) 번역자 주: (i) 바로 여기서, 'inordinate'(과도하다)라는 형용사의 정의(definition)가 다음과 같이 주어지고 있다:
[영혼의 부분들이] 과도하다(inordinate) [시림의] 몸(body)의 부분들이, 그들이 자연의 질서(the order of nature) 쪽으로 따름(to comply with)에 실패할 때에, 질서로부터 벗어났다/무질서하다(be out of order)라고 말해지듯이, 또한 마찬가지로 [시림의] 영혼(the soul)[즉, 혼]의 부분들(partium animae)은, 그들이 이성의 질서(the order of reason)에 종속하지 않을(not subject to) 때에, 과도하다(inordinate)라고 말해집니다. 이는 이성(reason)이 영혼[즉, 혼](the soul)의 부분들(partium animae)에 대한 통제하는/지배하는 힘(the ruling/governing(regitiva, rego; to keep straight or from going wrong) power of the soul's parts)이기(*3) 때문입니다. (이상, '과도하다'(inordinate)라는 용어의 정의(definition) 끝) 또한 라틴어 정본: 신학 대전, Ia IIae, q77, a3 co 필히 참조할 것. (ii) 다른 한편으로, 다음의 주소에 접속하면, 'ordinate'(과도하지 않다)라는 형용사의 정의(definition)를 학습할 수 있다: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1675.htm <----- 또한 필독 권고 [제목: 다른 죄의 원인으로서 하나의 죄(one sin) [Ia IIae q84 신학대전여행 및 신학대전; 게시일자: 2016-02-02]
(*3) 번역자 주: 바로 여기서, 이성적 영혼, 즉, 이성이 있는/통제하는 영혼(rational soul)이란, 정의에 의하여(by definition), 식물의 혼(anima)인 생혼(vegetative soul)에 고유한 생장 기능(vegetative functions)들과 동물의 혼(anima)인 각혼(sensitive soul)에 고유한 감각 기능(sensitive functions)들, 이들 두 기능들을 포함하는 사람의 혼(anima), 즉, 영혼(soul)을 말한다(신학 대전, Ia, q78). 여기서, 이성(reason)이 이들 두 기능들의 활동(activity)을 통제하는 힘(the ruling/governing(regitiva, rego; to keep straight or from going wrong) power of the parts of the soul)을 지니고 있음(신학 대전, Ia IIae, q77, a3 co)을 기술하고 있다. 라틴어 정본: 신학 대전, Ia IIae, q77, a3 co 필히 참조할 것: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/rational_soul_3777r.htm [주: 본글, 즉, 이 용어의 정의(definition)가 주어진 성 토마스 아퀴나스의 신학 대전 Ia IIae, q77, a3 영어본] ------
Reply to Objection 1.
Just as in the body the stronger the movement against the order of nature, the
greater the weakness, so likewise, the stronger the movement of passion against
the order of reason, the greater the weakness of the soul. Reply to Objection 2. Sin consists chiefly in an act of the will, which is not hindered by weakness of the body: for he that is weak in body may have a will ready for action, and yet be hindered by a passion, as stated above (Article 1). Hence when we speak of sins of weakness, we refer to weakness of soul rather than of body. And yet even weakness of soul is called weakness of the flesh, in so far as it is owing to a condition of the flesh that the passions of the soul arise in us through the sensitive appetite being a power using a corporeal organ. Reply to Objection 3. It is in the will's power to give or refuse its consent to what passion inclines us to do, and it is in this sense that our appetite is said to be under us; and yet this consent or dissent of the will is hindered in the way already explained (Article 1). Article 4. Whether self-love is the source of every sin?
부제(副題) 1: 온갖 죄(every sin)는 과도한 나르시시즘/자아도취증(inordinate narcissism/self-love)의 열매(fruit)이다 [링크 주소 1: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/온갖_죄는_과도한_나르시시즘(inordinate_narcissism)의_열매이다_3777r.htm (클릭하지 마십시오)]
부제(副題) 2: 과도한 나르시시즘/자아도취증(inordinate narcissism/self-love)은 온갖 죄(every sin)를 산출한다(produces) [링크 주소 2: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/과도한_나르시시즘(inordinate_narcissism)은_온갖_죄를_산출한다_3777r.htm (클릭하지 마십시오)] Objection 1. It would seem that self-love is not the source of every sin. For that which is good and right in itself is not the proper cause of sin. Now love of self is a good and right thing in itself: wherefore man is commanded to love his neighbor as himself (Leviticus 19:18). Therefore self-love cannot be the proper cause of sin. Objection 2. Further, the Apostle says (Romans 7:8): "Sin taking occasion by the commandment wrought in me all manner of concupiscence"; on which words a gloss says that "the law is good, since by forbidding concupiscence, it forbids all evils," the reason for which is that concupiscence is the cause of every sin. Now concupiscence is a distinct passion from love, as stated above (I-II:3:2; I-II:23:4). Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. Objection 3. Further, Augustine in commenting on Psalm 79:17, "Things set on fire and dug down," says that "every sin is due either to love arousing us to undue ardor or to fear inducing false humility." Therefore self-love is not the only cause of sin. Objection 4. Further, as man sins at times through inordinate love of self, so does he sometimes through inordinate love of his neighbor. Therefore self-love is not the cause of every sin. On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) that "self-love, amounting to contempt of God, builds up the city of Babylon." Now every sin makes man a citizen of Babylon. Therefore self-love is the cause of every sin. I answer that, As stated above (I-II:75:1), the proper and direct cause of sin is to be considered on the part of the adherence to a mutable good; in which respect every sinful act proceeds from inordinate desire for some temporal good. Now the fact that anyone desires a temporal good inordinately, is due to the fact that he loves himself inordinately; for to wish anyone some good is to love him.(*) Therefore it is evident that inordinate love of self is the cause of every sin. [즉, 과도한 나르시시즘(inordinate self-love/narcissism)에서만 오로지 '탐욕' 등 온갖 죄가 산출됩니다, 즉, '탐욕' 등 온갖 죄는 과도한 나르시시즘(inordinate self-love/narcissism)의 열매(fruit)입니다.] ----- (*) 게시자 주: 여기서 말하는 anyone(어떤 이)에는 자기 자신도 포함됨에 반드시 주목하라. 예를 들어, 다음의 주소에 접속하면, 영어본 가톨릭 교회 교리서 제1766항에 있는 매우 심각한 번역 오류를 지적하는 필자의 졸고[게시일자: 2015-05-17]를 읽을 수 있다. 필독을 권고드린다: ----- Reply to Objection 1. Well ordered self-love, whereby man desires a fitting good for himself, is right and natural; but it is inordinate self-love, leading to contempt of God, that Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 28) reckons to be the cause of sin. Reply to Objection 2. Concupiscence, whereby a man desires good for himself, is reduced to self-love as to its cause, as stated. Reply to Objection 3. Man is said to love both the good he desires for himself, and himself to whom he desires it. Love, in so far as it is directed to the object of desire (e.g. a man is said to love wine or money) admits, as its cause, fear which pertains to avoidance of evil: for every sin arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil. But each of these is reduced to self-love, since it is through loving himself that man either desires good things, or avoids evil things. Reply to Objection 4. A friend is like another self (Ethic. ix): wherefore the sin which is committed through love for a friend, seems to be committed through self-love. Article 5. Whether concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life are fittingly described as causes of sin? Objection 1. It would seem that "concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life" are unfittingly described as causes of sin. Because, according to the Apostle (1 Timothy 6:10), "covetousness [Douay: 'The desire of money'] is the root of all evils." Now pride of life is not included in covetousness. Therefore it should not be reckoned among the causes of sin. Objection 2. Further, concupiscence of the flesh is aroused chiefly by what is seen by the eyes, according to Daniel 13:56: "Beauty hath deceived thee." Therefore concupiscence of the eyes should not be condivided with concupiscence of the flesh. Objection 3. Further, concupiscence is desire for pleasure, as stated above (I-II:30:2). Now objects of pleasure are perceived not only by the sight, but also by the other senses. Therefore "concupiscence of the hearing" and of the other senses should also have been mentioned. Objection 4. Further, just as man is induced to sin, through inordinate desire of good things, so is he also, through inordinate avoidance of evil things, as stated above (Article 4, Reply to Objection 3). But nothing is mentioned here pertaining to avoidance of evil. Therefore the causes of sin are insufficiently described. On the contrary, It is written (1 John 2:16): "All that is in the world is concupiscence of the flesh, or [Vulgate: 'and'] pride of life." Now a thing is said to be "in the world" by reason of sin: wherefore it is written (1 John 5:19): "The whole world is seated in wickedness." Therefore these three are causes of sin.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 4), inordinate self-love is the cause of every sin. Now self-love includes inordinate desire of good: for a man desires good for the one he loves. Hence it is evident that inordinate desire of good is the cause of every sin. Now good is, in two ways, the object of the sensitive appetite, wherein are the passions which are the cause of sin: first, absolutely, according as it is the object of the concupiscible part; secondly, under the aspect of difficulty, according as it is the object of the irascible part, as stated above (I-II:23:1). Again, concupiscence is twofold, as stated above (I-II:30:3). One is natural, and is directed to those things which sustain the nature of the body, whether as regards the preservation of the individual, such as food, drink, and the like, or as regards the preservation of the species, such as sexual matters: and the inordinate appetite of such things is called "concupiscence of the flesh." The other is spiritual concupiscence, and is directed to those things which do not afford sustentation or pleasure in respect of the fleshly senses, but are delectable in respect of the apprehension or imagination, or some similar mode of perception;(*) such are money, apparel, and the like; and this spiritual concupiscence is called "concupiscence of the eyes," whether this be taken as referring to the sight itself, of which the eyes are the organ, so as to denote curiosity according to Augustine's exposition (Confess. x); or to the concupiscence of things which are proposed outwardly to the eyes, so as to denote covetousness, according to the explanation of others. ----- (*) 번역자 주: 다음의 주소에 접속하면, 'mode'(양태, 樣態)의 의미를 기술하고 있는 "신학 대전 여행" 및 "신학 대전", Ia, q5 선함(호미, 미호, bonum, goodness), a5 [게시일자: 2018-01-14]를 학습할 수 있다: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1888.htm ----- The inordinate appetite of the arduous good pertains to the "pride of life"; for pride is the inordinate appetite of excellence, as we shall state further on (I-II:84:2; II-II:162:1). It is therefore evident that all passions that are a cause of sin can be reduced to these three: since all the passions of the concupiscible part can be reduced to the first two, and all the irascible passions to the third, which is not divided into two because all the irascible passions conform to spiritual concupiscence. Reply to Objection 1. "Pride of life" is included in covetousness according as the latter denotes any kind of appetite for any kind of good. How covetousness, as a special vice, which goes by the name of "avarice," is the root of all sins, shall be explained further on (I-II:84:1. Reply to Objection 2. "Concupiscence of the eyes" does not mean here the concupiscence for all things which can be seen by the eyes, but only for such things as afford, not carnal pleasure in respect of touch, but in respect of the eyes, i.e. of any apprehensive power. Reply to Objection 3. The sense of sight is the most excellent of all the senses, and covers a larger ground, as stated in Metaph. i: and so its name is transferred to all the other senses, and even to the inner apprehensions, as Augustine states (De Verb. Dom., serm. xxxiii). Reply to Objection 4. Avoidance of evil is caused by the appetite for good, as stated above (I-II:25:2; I-II:39:2); and so those passions alone are mentioned which incline to good, as being the causes of those which cause inordinately the avoidance of evil. Article 6. Whether sin is alleviated on account of a passion? Objection 1. It would seem that sin is not alleviated on account of passion. For increase of cause adds to the effect: thus if a hot thing causes something to melt, a hotter will do so yet more. Now passion is a cause of sin, as stated (Article 5). Therefore the more intense the passion, the greater the sin. Therefore passion does not diminish sin, but increases it. Objection 2. Further, a good passion stands in the same relation to merit, as an evil passion does to sin. Now a good passion increases merit: for a man seems to merit the more, according as he is moved by a greater pity to help a poor man. Therefore an evil passion also increases rather than diminishes a sin. Objection 3. Further, a man seems to sin the more grievously, according as he sins with a more intense will. But the passion that impels the will makes it tend with greater intensity to the sinful act. Therefore passion aggravates a sin. On the contrary, The passion of concupiscence is called a temptation of the flesh. But the greater the temptation that overcomes a man, the less grievous his sin, as Augustine states (De Civ. Dei iv, 12). I answer that, Sin consists essentially in an act of the free will, which is a faculty of the will and reason; while passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite. Now the sensitive appetite can be related to the free-will, antecedently and consequently: antecedently, according as a passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines the reason or will, as stated above (Articles 1 and 2; I-II:10:3); and consequently, in so far as the movements of the higher powers redound on to the lower, since it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite. Accordingly if we take passion as preceding the sinful act, it must needs diminish the sin: because the act is a sin in so far as it is voluntary, and under our control. Now a thing is said to be under our control, through the reason and will: and therefore the more the reason and will do anything of their own accord, and not through the impulse of a passion, the more is it voluntary and under our control. In this respect passion diminishes sin, in so far as it diminishes its voluntariness. On the other hand, a consequent passion does not diminish a sin, but increases it; or rather it is a sign of its gravity, in so far, to wit, as it shows the intensity of the will towards the sinful act; and so it is true that the greater the pleasure or the concupiscence with which anyone sins, the greater the sin. Reply to Objection 1. Passion is the cause of sin on the part of that to which the sinner turns. But the gravity of a sin is measured on the part of that from which he turns, which results accidentally from his turning to something else—accidentally, i.e. beside his intention. Now an effect is increased by the increase, not of its accidental cause, but of its direct cause. Reply to Objection 2. A good passion consequent to the judgment of reason increases merit; but if it precede, so that a man is moved to do well, rather by his passion than by the judgment of his reason, such a passion diminishes the goodness and praiseworthiness of his action. Reply to Objection 3. Although the movement of the will incited by the passion is more intense, yet it is not so much the will's own movement, as if it were moved to sin by the reason alone. Article 7. Whether passion excuses from sin altogether? Objection 1. It would seem that passion excuses from sin altogether. For whatever causes an act to be involuntary, excuses from sin altogether. But concupiscence of the flesh, which is a passion, makes an act to be involuntary, according to Galatians 5:17: "The flesh lusteth against the spirit . . . so that you do not the things that you would." Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. Objection 2. Further, passion causes a certain ignorance of a particular matter, as stated above (Article 2; I-II:76:3). But ignorance of a particular matter excuses from sin altogether, as stated above (I-II:6:8). Therefore passion excuses from sin altogether. Objection 3. Further, disease of the soul is graver than disease of the body. But bodily disease excuses from sin altogether, as in the case of mad people. Much more, therefore, does passion, which is a disease of the soul. On the contrary, The Apostle (Romans 7:5) speaks of the passions as "passions of sins," for no other reason than that they cause sin: which would not be the case if they excused from sin altogether. Therefore passion does not excuse from sin altogether. I answer that, An act which, in its genus, is evil, cannot be excused from sin altogether, unless it be rendered altogether involuntary. Consequently, if the passion be such that it renders the subsequent act wholly involuntary, it entirely excuses from sin; otherwise, it does not excuse entirely. In this matter two points apparently should be observed: first, that a thing may be voluntary either "in itself," as when the will tends towards it directly; or "in its cause," when the will tends towards that cause and not towards the effect; as is the case with one who wilfully gets drunk, for in that case he is considered to do voluntarily whatever he does through being drunk. Secondly, we must observe that a thing is said to be voluntary "directly" or "indirectly"; directly, if the will tends towards it; indirectly, if the will could have prevented it, but did not. Accordingly therefore we must make a distinction: because a passion is sometimes so strong as to take away the use of reason altogether, as in the case of those who are mad through love or anger; and then if such a passion were voluntary from the beginning, the act is reckoned a sin, because it is voluntary in its cause, as we have stated with regard to drunkenness. If, however, the cause be not voluntary but natural, for instance, if anyone through sickness or some such cause fall into such a passion as deprives him of the use of reason, his act is rendered wholly involuntary, and he is entirely excused from sin. Sometimes, however, the passion is not such as to take away the use of reason altogether; and then reason can drive the passion away, by turning to other thoughts, or it can prevent it from having its full effect; since the members are not put to work, except by the consent of reason, as stated above (I-II:17:9): wherefore such a passion does not excuse from sin altogether. Reply to Objection 1. The words, "So that you do not the things that you would" are not to be referred to outward deeds, but to the inner movement of concupiscence; for a man would wish never to desire evil, in which sense we are to understand the words of Romans 7:19: "The evil which I will not, that I do." Or again they may be referred to the will as preceding the passion, as is the case with the incontinent, who act counter to their resolution on account of their concupiscence. Reply to Objection 2. The particular ignorance which excuses altogether, is ignorance of a circumstance, which a man is unable to know even after taking due precautions. But passion causes ignorance of law in a particular case, by preventing universal knowledge from being applied to a particular act, which passion the reason is able to drive away, as stated. Reply to Objection 3. Bodily disease is involuntary: there would be a comparison, however, if it were voluntary, as we have stated about drunkenness, which is a kind of bodily disease. Article 8. Whether a sin committed through passion can be mortal? Objection 1. It would seem that sin committed through passion cannot be mortal. Because venial sin is condivided with mortal sin. Now sin committed from weakness is venial, since it has in itself a motive for pardon [venia]. Since therefore sin committed through passion is a sin of weakness, it seems that it cannot be mortal. Objection 2. Further, the cause is more powerful than its effect. But passion cannot be a mortal sin, for there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, as stated above (I-II:74:4). Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be mortal.
Objection 3. Further, passion is a
hindrance to reason, as explained above (Article 1,Article 2). Now it belongs to
the reason to turn to God, or to turn away from Him, which is the essence of a
mortal sin. Therefore a sin committed through passion cannot be
mortal.
On the contrary, The
Apostle says (Romans 7:5) that "the passions of the sins . . . work [Vulgate:
'did work'] in our members to bring forth fruit unto death." Now it is proper to
mortal sin to bring forth fruit unto death. Therefore sin committed through
passion may be mortal. Reply to Objection 1. A sin may be venial in three ways. First, through its cause, i.e. through having cause to be forgiven, which cause lessens the sin; thus a sin that is committed through weakness or ignorance is said to be venial. Secondly, through its issue; thus every sin, through repentance, becomes venial, i.e. receives pardon [veniam]. Thirdly, by its genus, e.g. an idle word. This is the only kind of venial sin that is opposed to mortal sin: whereas the objection regards the first kind. Reply to Objection 2. Passion causes sin as regards the adherence to something. But that this be a mortal sin regards the aversion, which follows accidentally from the adherence, as stated above (Article 6, Reply to Objection 1): hence the argument does not prove.
Reply to Objection 3. Passion does not always hinder the act of reason altogether: consequently the reason remains in possession of its free-will, so as to turn away from God, or turn to Him. If, however, the use of reason be taken away altogether, the sin is no longer either mortal or venial. † 성부와 성자와 성령의 이름으로 아멘. 0 74 2 과도하다(inordinate)의_정의(definition),나약함(weakness)의_정의(definition),과도한_나르시시즘,과도한_자기애(inordinate_self-love)
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