"Communio" is the central and dominant theme of Vatican II, which presents the Church as the communion of the People of God, open to all men: a divine force to gather them into one. "The Church, in Christ, is in the nature of sacrament - a sign and instrument, that is, of communion with God and of unity among all men" [Lumen Gentium 1.]. And the Council issued a powerful call and laid down the inspirational guidelines for renewing the Church and the world through this sense of "communio" [cf. Relatio Finalis of the Extraordinary Synod of Bishops, Dec. 7, 1985: Enchiridion Vaticanum 9, 1800-1809.].
But at same time as it proposed "communio", Vatican II also sparked off a vigorous trend of personalist thinking. The Council is not just community-centered, it is also person-centered. And, as is well known, the magisterium of John Paul II, with its keen emphasis on human and ecclesial communion, is also strongly characterized by an articulate personalist philosophy. Now, a first reaction to this combination of concerns - community-centeredness and person-centeredness - could be to wonder if they can really go together. Is there not a tension between the two, one bearing in on the person and the other out on the community? Is there not even a logical opposition between them? If this is not so, how do they relate and how can they be harmonised? There is in fact a natural harmony between the two, but it can only be seen if one properly understands the true nature of personalism.
Personalism
Personalism is a view of man which places emphasis on his dignity as a son of God. It stresses his dynamic character as a being called to fulfillment, particularly by freely committing himself to worthwhile and lasting values. Personalism is strongly conscious of personal freedom: one's own and that of others. And so it is conscious of personal responsibility.
Personalism has a keen awareness of personal dignity and rights; and will defend them against any violation; in one's self or in others. But being conscious of rights, it is also conscious of duties [1]. Personalism therefore sees no degradation in the duty e.g. to be obedient to the truth or to legitimate authority. On the contrary, it sees in this a peculiar expression of man's dignity; his ability to discern and respond to values. So Karol Wojtyla says, "the person realizes himself most adequately in [the fulfillment of] his obligations" [The Acting Person, Reidel, 1979, p. 169.].
So, whoever possesses a true personalist spirit is conscious of the dignity and rights of others as much as of his own. He is naturally filled with respect for others in whom he sees brothers and sisters in Christ, children of the same Father. Personalism particularly stresses duties towards other persons, and sees the fulfillment of these duties also as a means of personal growth and self-fulfillment. Self-gift is of the essence of personalism, so much so that the key personalist text of Vatican II insists that "it is only in the sincere gift of himself that man can find himself" [Gaudium et Spes 24.].
Personalism finds personal values everywhere, in everyone. It tends to be open and responsive to these values; and by responding to them, it is enriched. Pope John Paul II, in the Encyclical Centesimus Annus, writes: "When man does not recognize in himself and in others the value and grandeur of the human person, he effectively deprives himself of the possibility of benefitting from his humanity and of entering into that relationship of solidarity and communion with others for which God created him" [no. 41.]. The fact is that human nature has an "essentially relational character". The person grows and is enriched in open, receptive and responsive contact with others; the alternative is social isolation and human alienation [cf. E. Wolicka: "Participation in community: Wojtila's social anthropology" Communio 8 (1981), pp. 111; 115-116.],
This awareness of values in others is of course a powerful basis and aid for the building of community. In true personalism there is a natural alliance between the person - the individual human being - and the community. Personalist participation in community implies not a mere adaptation of interests to interests, but of person to person, based on the consciousness of commonly shared dignity and rights.
Christian personalism is community-oriented on a deeper level still, because it implies community of each with Christ. The Christian "realizes" himself or herself in communion with Christ, in openness to Christ; and this means that self-fulfillment follows an outward, not an inward, movement. It looks for a center, but the center is not in oneself, it is in Christ; and in others, in Christ.
Thus, personalism and community are in the same line [cf. The Acting Person, pp. 276ss.]. Christian personalism proposes a fundamental vocation of each one to communion. In developing one's personal life in communion with Christ, one has to fight against self-centeredness and so one becomes more open to communion with others. One finds oneself in giving oneself. It is clear therefore how personalism not only harmonizes with community, but is actually a condition of a healthy and dynamic community. The fact is that a community not built on respect for personal dignity ends up as a soulless mass or a concentration camp or a police state.
Individualism
Christian personalism, under this title, is a recent development which must be distinguished from another trend of thought and mode of life, that has long characterized the Western world. This is secular individualism which (along with collectivism [2]) has so largely dominated modern outlook and existence. The need to distinguish the two is all the more important in that individualism might easily be regarded as close to personalism, and even be mistaken for it (especially as certain forms of individualism use terminology that seems personalist); and yet it is entirely different, and in fact totally opposed to true christian personalism. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of distinguishing genuine christian personalism from all the "pseudo-personalisms" which are basically individualistic in nature.
Individualism is an enemy of community. For it, the individual is the supreme and fundamental good, and the interests of community or society have to be subordinated to the individual's interests. Where individual interests and the interests of others or common interests seem to clash, the individualist will put what he considers his own interests first [3]. Individualism stresses the autonomy of the individual to the extent of practically converting him (often without his realizing it) into his own God [4].
In a certain sense we can say that individualism appears as a sort of mutilated or fake personalism. It also stresses rights, but not duties. It demands freedom, but is suspicious of any permanent commitment and reluctant to take binding decisions. It wants freedom to act, but not the responsibility of having to answer for one's actions. It makes the individual, and not the truth, the standard of morality, the criterion of right and wrong. Its judgments tend to be subjective [5]. It leads to arbitrariness of conduct with little regard for the demands of social life. It is concerned for self, but not for others, unless the interests of others coincide with one's own. It will only defend the rights of others when this can be done at no cost to self. It will never defend a right of others when this involves a duty in self. Individualism tends to be blind or closed to the values to be found in others; it places emphasis on the individual seen as a world in himself or herself, as self-sufficient and autonomous, with nothing to gain from relating to others except self-aggrandizement.
At times it takes alert reflection to distinguish individualist and personalist appreciations Some writers, for instance, claiming to be personalist, make an easy equivalence between personalism and subjectivism. They are reasoning not as personalists but as individualists. Subjectivism is wholly individualistic and opposed to communio. In fact, a totally subjective morality is destructive of human community. If I can always follow "what's right for me", even if it is altogether offensive to others, the basis for social solidarity quickly collapses[6].
Individualism is an enemy of personal development. 'It is not good for man to be alone', or to think and act as if he were self-sufficient. He can only develop in relations of openness, respect and donation towards others, not of isolation, indifference, self-interest or exploitation. "An individual is someone who defines himself or herself away from a crowd, or the more universal mass of humanity in general. A person, on the other hand, actively creates the self through relationship with other persons in social and communal bonds" [Prudence Allen: "Integral sex complementarity" Communio 17 (1990), p. 537.]. John Paul II insists: "To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion" [Mulieris Dignitatem, n. 7.]; "acting and existing together with others", as he stresses throughout The Acting Person.
Individualism is an enemy of community; it lacks respect for others (especially their freedom), and is devoid of the spirit of service. The only bonds it creates with others are those of self-interest (hence its concept of society: a series of individuals associated by pragmatic interest or simple necessity). Where the individualist's interest is not clear, he will not be at one with others. This is destructive of any true community.
The common good
We could add a word here about the "common good" which Gaudium et Spes conceives in terms of those conditions which make it possible for man to achieve "a truly human life". It "embraces the sum total of all those conditions of social life which enable persons, families and associations to achieve their own perfection more fully and easily" [GS 26; cf. 74.]. It follows that since man is social by nature, the effort of each one to further the common good actually humanizes and personalizes him all the more. As Pope John Paul II says in the Apostolic Exhortation, Christifideles Laici, [there is] "an interdependence and reciprocity between the person and society: all that is accomplished in favour of the person is also a service rendered to society, and all that is done in favour of society redounds to the benefit of the person" [no. 40.].
For an individualist the "common good" is either a concept to be passed over, or else it is understood in materialistic terms, reduced to standard of living, public services, etc., and judged by merely economic or ideological parameters, not by those that are truly human, such as truth, sincerity, loyalty, honesty, justice and mutual respect. People in an individualist society tend more and more to see each other as rivals; hence distrust and apathy towards the very concept of society sets in. "As a result, there is a growing inability to situate particular interests within the framework of a coherent vision of the common good" [Centesimus Annus, no. 47.].
Now, all we have seen so far leads to an immensely important conclusion: one can be personalist and community-centered, one cannot be individualist and community-centered. The failure to realize this truth and to draw this distinction, has been a major obstacle to the renewal envisaged by Vatican II. Many post-conciliar attempts at renewal have been flawed because they have been imbued with individualism rather than true christian personalism. Let us offer some examples.
Some areas
a) Doctrine. The dichotomy "community-personalism" and individualism is well illustrated in the opposition between properly understood pluralism, on the one hand, and radical dissent on the other. Healthy pluralism (different approaches to, or applications of, fundamental truths that are held in common) is a sign of respect both for the truth and for the rights of all, and is equally a sign of the vitality of the community. Dissent, in the sense of the rejection of clear teaching proposed by the Magisterium in its service of the People of God, marks an inability to think with the community, and to maintain one's links with the Mind of Christ as he clarifies it for us down the ages through the channels he has established. Such dissent is essentially individualist [7], and is one of the most powerful elements working for the rupture of community today. In the theologian, no less than in any other Christian, effective concern for the rights of the people - and not just for one's own rights or those of a particular group - is a major test of the sense of "communio" [cf. Donum Veritatis: Instruction on the ecclesial role of the theologian (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, May 24, 1990) (especially nos. 6, 11, 27, 32, 39-40): AAS 88 (1990) 1550-1570.].
"Theological develop¬ment and wholeness are found in community, not in isolation. Theological research in the spirit of "communio" is a search for the common truths and insights that bind me to others in Christ. The solitary thinker who follows no guidelines but his own mind, thinks himself into further isolation and loneliness. The thinker who is attuned to the Mind of Christ in the Church, is never alone. He is in communion with Christ and with the whole community of Christ's faithful who have lived in fellowship, and thought and believed in it, since apostolic times" [C. Burke: Authority and Freedom in the Church, Ignatius Press, 1988, p. 184.].
b) Inter-ecclesial relations. In the inter-play between those two great Catholic themes - unity and variety - some sort of tension is inevitable; tension, for instance, between local communities and diocesan authority, or between the particular churches of a country and the Holy See [C. Burke, op. cit., Ch. 17.]. But where ecclesial sense is healthy and strong, these tensions are normally of minor importance and short duration. A constant clamor for local rights, however, betokens a failure to realize that the maintenance of the unity of the whole Church - of person with person and part with part - was Christ's special concern expressed at the Last Supper, and remains an obligation of loyalty for each one of us. The personalist easily understands and responds to this concern; the individualist does so with great difficulty.
c) Married personalism. A pseudo-personalism holds that marriage today needs to be freed from institutional restraints: exclusive commitments, permanent bonds, procreative burdens. And - the argument goes - only if marriage is so liberated, can a true personalist marital philosophy be developed, where the legitimate aspirations of modern man and woman are respected and realized. Recent years have in fact seen a strong reaction, also within the Church, against the "institu¬tional" view of marriage, suggesting that we need to turn away from it toward a "personalist" view which is more flexible, more enlightened, more liberal. For those who think this way, the "institutional" understanding of marriage includes procreativity (and here they are right), but excludes personalism (and here they are wrong) [8]. The defective anthropology underlying this can have the most serious consequences:
- In the moral field, one notes the concept of contraceptive marriage, which seeks to build a limited or closed conjugal community. Here it should be stressed that the "out-goingness" of true personalism - concerned not only with its own rights, but also with its duties to others - tends precisely to make it open-to-life. Individualism, on the other hand, considers the possibility of new life, not positively - as a good in itself - but questioningly: will it be a good to me? Contraceptive intercourse is counter-community, because it signifies and effects no real union between the spouses; it rather undermines the possibilities of their forming a mature and loving inter-personal communion [cf. the author's Covenanted Happiness, Ignatius Press, 1990, pp. 30-41.].
- In the canonical field, one frequently finds a mistaken notion that the renewed importance given to personal consent (freedom) makes commitment (to obligations) less likely to be genuine or complete. As we have noted, the concept of an irrevocable choice is foreign to individualism, since it regards any lasting bond as a menace to personal autonomy; while Christianity, in contrast, sees in the permanent commitment to a genuine value a major expression of the dignity and freedom of the person, as well as an essential condition for human maturing. To my mind, the abusive application of canon 1095, where this occurs, has its roots not in any true christian personalism, but rather in the psychological and individualistic "selfism" that so characterizes contemporary non-christian values.
Perhaps reference could also be made to canon 1097, ' 2, which states that error "concerning a quality of a person" invalidates matrimonial consent when the quality in question is directly and principally intended. While few marriages are in fact declared null under this canon, some judges seem to consider that the grounds contemplated by the canon could occur easily enough. One wonders if this is likely in our present day. To place social standing or professional qualities before the choice of the person - apart from showing an instrumentalization of the other party to one's own interests - surely reveals the mentality of a past age. Much the same would be true if one claimed to have subordinated one's choice of a spouse to his or her having the quality of being fertile; that would be redolent of a polygamic culture. Christian personalism insists that (as long as there has been no deceit) each one has the right to be accepted as the person he or she is, with his or her good and bad qualities, limitations and defects.
- In the anthropological field, one notes the loss of the sense that the married commitment is naturally exclusive, fruitful and permanent. It is characteristic of individualism not to understand the goodness of these three properties, the traditional "bona" or values of marriage.
d) Liturgy. Here the dangers are especially great, because it is quite possible to create many apparently healthy - but merely external - expressions of "community" experience and life, although the participants' spirit remains individualistic. The experience that we basically need to find in the liturgy is that of communing with Christ - above all in his saving Pasion and Death - and with all his members of all ages and places.
e) Feminism. There is of course a legitimate christian feminism with a personalist bases which stresses the personal (and special) dignity of woman, as well as her human rights and duties. By and large, however, the modern feminist movement is not personalist but strongly individualist. It wants "rights", but they often have no correspondence to (or are in flat contradiction with) the real dignity and role of woman. Current feminism never speaks about the service or the duties through the fulfilment of which woman makes her distinctive contribution to the community, and so also works for her own true fulfillment. A fundamental individualism, with its stress on a self-sufficient autonomy, no doubt explains the divisiveness which characterizes the movement. If it has proved unable to evoke a positive response among the majority of women, this is also because it fails to create a true and appealing sense of fellowship - communion - among them.
f) Service ("diakonia"; another great theme of Vatican II). This is specially asked of the priest, who is called to service in a particular vocational way, in imitation of Jesus Christ. He should literally be at the beck and call of the people, in all their legitimate rights. A good pride in being a servant of the people is a sign of a personalist triumph over individualism. Whoever wants to serve, wants to be available and to be identifiable for service; hence, for instance, derives the logic of clerical or religious garb in public places.
g) Closely connected is the need for discipline. Discipline, especially among the servants of the community, is essential if people are to to draw life-giving support from the experience of "communio". The rights of the people can only be protected if there is a readiness to obey. Teamwork, captainship, leadership, discipleship, response: all these call for discipline, make for community, and offer the dynamism necessary for renewal.
Renewal
Renewal begins when the person finds or creates links with the community: when he is prepared to face up to the individualistic, separatist, self-centered elements in himself which are anti-communio and divide him from others or from the center, and to combat them in favor of others; when he is prepared to serve, to respect the rights of others and to live his duties in their regard; when he realizes that the community established by Christ is hierarchical; and therefore calls for a readiness to accept authority, as the safeguard of people's freedom, above all the fundamental personal freedom to have access to Christ: his Mind, his grace, His Truth.
The antidote to individualism and the root of communion are of course found in the personal friendship and union of each one with Christ. Without renewal at this personal level, all efforts at external communion will remain just that: purely external. And they will be constantly threatened by individualism. A life of personal (not just collective) prayer is at the basis of any christian renewal; and so especially is a life of penance and self-denial. It is the Gospel paradox of always: only he who loses his life will find it - in himself and in others.
NOTES
[1] Rights and duties are correlative; there can be no genuine philosophy of rights which is not also a philosophy of duties.
[2] "Collectivism is no solution to the problem of modern individualism. Individualism and collectivism are two antithetical extremes which have in common only that they both leave the individual on his own. They both miss the essence of the human person who finds happiness and peace only in personal union, in common values and goals, in mutual giving and the sharing of personal values": Walter Kasper: "Church as *Communio+" Communio 13 (1986), p. 100.
[3] "Individualism limits participation, since it isolates the person from others by conceiving him solely as an individual who concentrates on himself and on his own good; this latter is also regarded in isolation from the good of others and of the community. The good of the individual is then treated as if it were opposed or in contradiction to other individuals and their good; at best, this good, in essence, may be considered as involving self-preservation and self-defense. From the point of view of individualism, to act "together with others", just as to exist "together with others", is a necessity that the individual has to submit to, a necessity that corresponds to none of his very own features or positive properties; neither does the acting and existing together with others serve or develop any of the individual's positive and essential constituents. For the individual the "others" are a source of limitation, they may even appear to represent the opposite pole in a variety of conflicting interests. If a community is formed, its purpose is to protect the good of the individual from the "others". The Acting Person, pp. 273-274.
[4] It was directly to man's individualist spirit that the first temptation was of course addressed: "You will be like Gods": Gen. 3: 5.
[5] "Objective", just as "abstract", tend to be unfavored terms to the individualist: "existential" is favored.
[6] "The opinion that man's individual conscience could itself establish this [objective] order [of morality or law] distorts the correct proportions in the relations between the person and society or community... Such views are the source of arbitrary individualism": The Acting Person, p. 165.
[7] Wojtyla speaks of an attitude of "opposition" which, along with "solidarity", he regards as an "authentic" response to community (The Acting Person, pp. 286ss.). Such 'loyal opposition' is of course legitimate; and, as Wojtyla says, can mark a contribution to the community. While it may seem difficult at times to distinguish between radical dissent and legitimate "opposition", the difficulty is more theoretical than practical.
[8] This is dealt with at greater length in the author's study, "Marriage: a personalist or an institutional understanding?": Communio Summer 1992, pp. 278-304.
(이상, 발췌 끝)
