가톨릭 신앙생활 Q&A 코너

 

초벌 번역 일자: 2011년 10월 23일
번역자: 교수 소순태 마태오 (Ph.D.)
우리말 번역문 출처: http://club.catholic.or.kr/tourofsumma
본글로의 접속 주소: http://ch.catholic.or.kr/pundang/4/soh/1684.htm
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27. The Cause of Love

 

27. 사랑의 원인

 

1. Since love is the tendency experienced by its subject to haveto do good,since good thus stirs love to action, it is manifest that goodthe good is the proper cause of love.

 

1. 왜냐하면 사랑(love)이, 선(good)을 가지거나 혹은 행하기 위하여 그 주체(its subject)에 의하여 경험하게 되는, 경향(tendency)이기 때문에, 그리고 선(good)이 바로 그러한 방식으로 행동/능동(action) 쪽으로 사랑을 자극하기 때문에, 선(good) 혹은 선한 사물(the good)이 사랑의 고유한 원인(proper cause)임은 명백합니다.

 

2. Good, which is the goal as well as the cause of love, must, in sentientrational beings, be known before it can exercise its appeal. Hence knowledge is a cause of love.

 

2. 사랑(love)의 원인(cause)일뿐만이 아니라 목적(goal)인 선(good)은, 감각 인상(sense impressions)들에 반응하는[즉, 감각력 있는] 그리고 이성적인 있음(sentientrational beings)들에게, 그것이 자신의 매력을 행사할 수 있기 전에 알려져야 합니다(be known). 따라서 지식(knowledge)은 사랑의 어떤 원인(a cause)입니다.

 

3. Likenesssimilarity is a cause of love betweenamong creatures, for like attracts like. A creature necessarily loves itself; hence it has a natural tendency to love what is like itself.

 

3. 비슷함(likeness) 혹은 유사함(similarity)은 피조물들 둘 사이에서 그리고 여럿 사이에서 사랑의 ;한 원인(a cause)인데, 이는 유유상종(類類相從, like attracts like)이기 때문입니다. 피조물은 필연적으로 자기 자신을 사랑하며, 그리하여 그 결과 그것은 자기 자신과 비슷한 바를 사랑하는 자연적 경향(natural tendency)을 가지고 있습니다.

 

4. None of the other passions, singlytogether, can be regarded as the universal cause of love. A particular passion, such as desire, may cause a particular act of love, for one good can cause another good. But in general it must be said that the other passions presuppose love; they are products, rather than causes, of love.

 

4. 다른 정(情, passions)들 중의 어떠한 것도, 단독으로 혹은 함께, 사랑의 보편적 원인(universal cause)이라고 간주될 수 없습니다. 욕망(desire)과 같은 특별한 정(情, passion)은 사랑의 어떤 특별한 행위(act)를 야기할 수 있는데, 이는 하나의 선(one good)이 또다른 선(another good)을 야기할 수 있기 때문입니다. 그러나 속(屬)적으로(in general) 다른 정(情, passion)은 사랑을 전제로 하며(presuppose), 그리하여 그들은, 사랑의 원인들이라기 보다는 오히려, 사랑의 산출물들임이 말해져야 합니다.

 

영문본 출처: http://www.catholictheology.info/summa-theologica/summa-part2A.php?q=225

 

번역자 주: 다음의 주소에 있는 내용 요악 설명을 또한 읽도록 하라:
http://www3.nd.edu/~afreddos/courses/405/love.htm

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출처 1: http://www.newadvent.org/summa/2027.htm
출처 2: http://www.intratext.com/IXT/ENG0023/__P57.HTM

출처 3: http://www.logicmuseum.com/authors/aquinas/summa/Summa-IIa-26-29.htm#q27a1arg1

 

신학 대전 Ia IIae

 

Question 27. The cause of love

 

We must now consider the cause of love:under this head there are
four points of inquiry:

 

이제 우리는 사랑의 원인에 대하여 고찰하여야 하며, 그리고 이러한 표제 아래에 질문에 있어서의 네 개의 요지들이 다음과 있습니다:

1.Is good the only cause of love?
2.Is knowledge a cause of love?
3.Is likeness a cause of love?
4.Is any other passion of the soul a cause of love?

 

Article 1. Whether good is the only cause of love?

 

제1조. 선(good)이 사랑의 유일한 원인인지?

 

Objection 1. It would seem that good is not the only cause of love. For good does not cause love, except because it is loved. But it happens that evil also is loved, according to Psalm 10:6: "He that loveth iniquity, hateth his own soul": else, every love would be good. Therefore good is not the only cause of love.

 

Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who acknowledge their evils." Therefore it seems that evil is the cause of love.

 

Objection 3. Further, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that not "the good" only but also "the beautiful is beloved by all."

 

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 3): "Assuredly the good alone is beloved." Therefore good alone is the cause of love.

 

이와는 달리, 아우구스티노(Augustine)(De Trin. viii, 3)는 다음과 같이 말합니다: "확실히 선한 사물만이 홀로(alone) 사랑받게 된다." 그러므로 선(good)만이 홀로 사랑의 원인입니다.

 

I answer that, As stated above (Question 26, Article 1), Love belongs to the appetitive power which is a passive faculty. Wherefore its object stands in relation to it as the cause of its movementact. Therefore the cause of love must needs be love's object. Now the proper object of love is the good; because, as stated above (26, 1,2), love implies a certain connaturalnesscomplacency of the lover for the thing beloved,to everything, that thing is a good, which is akinproportionate to it. It follows, therefore, that good is the proper cause of love.

 

저는 다음과 같이 답변합니다. 위에서(질문 26, 제1조) 서술되었듯이, 사랑은 한 개의 수동적 능력(a passive faculty)인 욕구들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 힘(appetitive power)에 속합니다. 그런 이유로 그 대상은 그것에 대한 관계에 있어 그 움직임 혹은 행위(act)의 원인으로서 서 있습니다(stands). 그러므로 사랑의 원인은 사랑의 대상이 아닐 수 없습니다. 그런데 사랑의 고유한 대상은 선한 사물(the good)인데, 왜냐하면, 위에서(26, 1,2) 서술되었듯이, 사랑은 사랑받게 되는 사물에 대한, 그리고, 그것에 동족이고(akin) 그리고 비례하는(proportionate), 바로 그 사물이 한 선(a good)인 모든 사물 쪽으로, 사랑하는 자의 어떤 확실한 본성에 의하여 연결됨(connaturalness) 혹은 자기 만족(complacency)을 의미하기 때문입니다. 그러므로 선이 사랑의 고유한 원인임이 결론으로서 뒤따릅니다.

 

Reply to Objection 1. Evil is never loved except under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect,is considered as being good simply.thus a certain love is evil, in so far as it tends to that which is not simply a true good. It is in this way that man "loves iniquity," inasmuch as, by means of iniquity, some good is gained; pleasure, for instance,money,such like.

 

Reply to Objection 2. Those who acknowledge their evils, are beloved, not for their evils, but because they acknowledge them, for it is a good thing to acknowledge one's faults, in so far as it excludes insincerityhypocrisy.

 

Reply to Objection 3. The beautiful is the same as the good,they differ in aspect only. For since good is what all seek, the notion of good is that which calms the desire; while the notion of the beautiful is that which calms the desire, by being seenknown. Consequently those senses chiefly regard the beautiful, which are the most cognitive, viz. sighthearing, as ministering to reason; for we speak of beautiful sightsbeautiful sounds. But in reference to the other objects of the other senses, we do not use the expression "beautiful," for we do not speak of beautiful tastes,beautiful odors. Thus it is evident that beauty adds to goodness a relation to the cognitive faculty: so that "good" means that which simply pleases the appetite; while the "beautiful" is something pleasant to apprehend.

 

Article 2. Whether knowledge is a cause of love?

 

제2조. 지식이 사랑의 한 원인인지?

 

Objection 1. It would seem that knowledge is not a cause of love. For it is due to love that a thing is sought. But some things are sought without being known, for instance, the sciences; for since "to have them is the same as to know them," as Augustine says (Q83, qu. 35), if we knew them we should have them,should not seek them. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

 

Objection 2. Further, to love what we know not seems like loving something more than we know it. But some things are loved more than they are known: thus in this life God can be loved in Himself, but cannot be known in Himself. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

 

Objection 3. Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, there would be no love, where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv); whereas there is not knowledge in all things. Therefore knowledge is not the cause of love.

 

On the contrary, Augustine proves (De Trin. x, 1,2) that "none can love what he does not know."

 

이와는 달리, 아우구스티노(Augustine)(De Trin. x, 1,2)는 "누구도 자신이 알지 못하는 바를 사랑할 수 없음"을 증명합니다.  

 

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), good is the cause of love, as being its object. But good is not the object of the appetite, except as apprehended.therefore love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. For this reason the Philosopher (Ethic. ix, 5,12) says that bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love:in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.

 

저는 다음과 같이 답변합니다. 위에서(제1조) 서술되었듯이, 선(good)은, 사랑의 대상으로서, 사랑의 원인입니다. 그러나 선은, 알아차리게 되는 것으로서(as apprehended)를 제외하고, 욕구(the appetite)의 대상이 아닙니다. 그리하여 그 결과 사랑은 사랑받게 되는 선한 사물에 대한 어떠한 알아차림(apprehension)을 요구합니다. 바로 이 이유 때문에 철학자[즉, 아리스토텔레스(Aristotle)](Ethic. ix, 5,12)는 신체적 보임(bodily sight)이 감각들에 의하여 경험하게 되는 사랑/외부의 작인(作因)/동인(動因)(external agents)들에 의하여 흥분하게 될 수 있는 사랑(sensitive love)의 시작이며, 그리하여 마찬가지 방식으로 영적(spiritual) 아름다움 혹은 선함(beauty or goodness)에 대한 관상(contemplation)이 영적 사랑(spiritual love)의 시작입니다. 따라서 지식(knowledge)은, 알게 되어야만 오로시 사랑받게 될 수 있는 선(good)이 그러한 것과 동일한 이유 때문에, 사랑의 원인입니다.

 

Reply to Objection 1. He who seeks science, is not entirely without knowledge thereof: but knows something about it already in some respect, either in a general way,in some one of its effects,from having heard it commended, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1,2). But to have it is not to know it thus, but to know it perfectly.

 

Reply to Objection 2. Something is required for the perfection of knowledge, that is not requisite for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to the reason, whose function it is to distinguish things which in reality are united,to unite together, after a fashion, things that are distinct, by comparing one with another. Consequently the perfection of knowledge requires that man should know distinctly all that is in a thing, such as its parts, powers,properties. On the other hand, love is in the appetitive power, which regards a thing as it is in itself: wherefore it suffices, for the perfection of love, that a thing be loved according as it is known in itself. Hence it is, therefore, that a thing is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known. This is most evident in regard to the sciences, which some love through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others;this is what they love in rhetoric. The same applies to the love of God.

 

Reply to Objection 3. Even natural love, which is in all things, is caused by a kind of knowledge, not indeed existing in natural things themselves, but in Him Who created their nature, as stated above (26, 1; cf. I, 6, 1, ad 2).

 

Article 3. Whether likeness is a cause of love?

 

제3조. 비슷함이 사랑의 한 원인인지?

 

Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is written (Proverbs 13:10) that "among the proud there are always contentions";the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

 

Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another, that which he possesses himself,would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

 

Objection 3. Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health,a poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs themlacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.

 

Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow moneyhealth on us;also those who retain their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

 

On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like."

 

이와는 달리, 다음과 같이 쓰여 있습니다(집회 13,15(19)): "모든 짐승은 자신과 비슷한 존재를 사랑한다(loves, diligit)."

 

I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentiallyby way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place:again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.

 

저는 다음과 같이 답변합니다. 비슷함(likeness)은, 고유하게 말하여, 사랑의 한 원인입니다. 그러나 사물들 사이에 있는 비슷함이 두 겹임(twofold)은 반드시 주목되어야 합니다. 비슷함의 하나의 종류는 현실태적으로(actually) 동일한 질(quality)을 가지는 각 사물로부터 일어납니다: 예를 들어, 흼(whiteness)이라는 질(quality)을 소유하고 있는 두 사물들은 비슷하다고(alike) 말해집니다. 비슷함의 또다른 종류는, 다른 사물이 현실태적으로(actually) 가지고 있는 어떤 질(a quality)을, 가능태적으로(potentially) 그리고 기울어짐(inclination)의 방식으로 가지고 있는 하나의 사물(one thing)로부터 일어납니다: 바로 이러한 방식으로 그 고유한 자리 바깥에 존재하는 한 무거운 물체(body)가 그 고유한 자리에 존재하거나, 혹은 또다시, 가능태가 그 행위 쪽으로 어떤 닮음을 가짐에 따라, 또다른 무거운 물체와 비슷하다고 우리가 말할 수도 있는데, 왜냐하면 행위(act)는, 어떤 방식으로, 가능태(potentiality) 자체 안에 포함되기 때문입니다.

 

Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity,two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence,friendship founded on usefulnesspleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act;it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentientcognitive being.

 

따라서 비슷함의 첫 번째 종류는 우의(友誼) 혹은 안녕(잘 있음)에 기인하는/가 수단인 사랑(love of fiendship or well-being, amorem amicitiae)을 야기합니다. 이는 두 사람(two men)들이, 말하자면, 하나의 형상(one form)을 가짐으로써, 비슷하다는 바로 그 사실은, 어떤 방식으로, 바로 그 형상에 있어 그들을 하나(one)로 만들기 때문입니다. 따라서, 한 사람이 다른 사람과 하나(one)인 것처럼, 한 사람의 애정(affections)들이 다른 사람 쪽으로 기울어지는 경항을 가지며, 그리하여 그는 자기 자신 쪽으로 처럼 그자 쪽으로 선(good)을 바랍니다(wishes). 그러나 비슷함의 두 번째 종류는 사욕(私慾)/사욕편정(私慾偏情)에 기인하는/이 수단인 사랑(love of concupiscence, amorem concupiscentiae)을, 혹은 유용성(usefulness) 혹은 즐거움(pleasure)에 근거를 둔 우의(友誼)를 야기하는데, 왜냐하면 가능태에 있는 무엇이든지 간에, 그러한 것으로서, 자신의 행위(act)에 대한 욕망(desire)을 가지고, 그리하여 그것은, 만약에 그것이 한 명의, 감각 인상에 반응하는(sentient) 그리고 인식을 수행하는(cognitive), 있음(being)이라면, 그 실현 과정에서 즐거움을 취하기 때문입니다.

 

Now it has been stated above (Question 26, Article 4), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain:why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.

 

그런데 위에서(질문 26, 제4조) 사욕(私慾)/사욕편정(私慾偏情)에 기인하는 사랑에 있어, 사랑하는 자는, 고유하게 말하여, 자신이 욕망하는 선한 사물을 의도함에 있어, 자기 자신을 사랑한다고 이미 서술되었습니다. 그러나 한 사람은 다른 이보다 자기 자신을 더 사랑하는데, 왜냐하면 그는 본체적으로(substantially) 자기 자신과 하나이나, 이와는 달리 다른 이와 그는 어떠한 형상(some form)에 있어서의 비슷함에 있어서만 오로지 하나이기 때문입니다. 그 결과로, 만약에 한 형상에 참여 행위(participation)로부터 일어나는 바로 이러한 그자 쪽으로 다른 이의 비슷함이 그로 하여금 자신이 사랑하는 선한 사물을 획득하는 것을 방해한다면, 그는, 그자와 비슷하기 때문이 아니라, 그가 자신의 고유한 선을 획득하는 것을 그자가 방해하기 때문에, 그자를 싫어하게 됩니다(become hateful). 바로 이것이 "옹기장이들이 그들 사이에서 다투는" 이유인데, 왜냐하면 그들은 서로의 획득(gain)을 방해하기 때문이고, 그리고 "교만한 자(the proud)들 사이에서 다툼/경쟁(contentions)들이 있는" 이유인데, 왜냐하면 그들은 자신들이 몹시 탐내는(covet) 자리를 획득함에 있어 서로 방해하기 때문입니다.

 

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

 

따라서 첫 번째 반대에 대한 답변은 분명합니다.

 

Reply to Objection 2. Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.

 

Reply to Objection 3. He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.

 

Reply to Objection 4. According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason.

 

Article 4. Whether any other passion of the soul is a cause of love?

 

제4조. 영혼의 어느 다른 정(passion)이 사랑의 한 원인인지?

 

Objection 1. It would seem that some other passion can be the cause of love. For the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) says that some are loved for the sake of the pleasure they give. But pleasure is a passion. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.

 

Objection 2. Further, desire is a passion. But we love some because we desire to receive something from them: as happens in every friendship based on usefulness. Therefore another passion is a cause of love.

 

Objection 3. Further, Augustine says (De Trin. x, 1): "When we have no hope of getting a thing, we love it but half-heartedlynot at all, even if we see how beautiful it is." Therefore hope too is a cause of love.

 

On the contrary, All the other emotions of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9).

 

이와는 달리, 영혼의 다른 감정(emotions)들 모두는, 아우구스티노(Augustine)(De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9)가 말하듯이, 사랑에 의하여 야기됩니다.

 

I answer that, There is no other passion of the soul that does not presuppose love of some kind. The reason is that every other passion of the soul implies either movement towards something,rest in something. Now every movement towards something,rest in something, arises from some kinshipaptness to that thing;in this does love consist. Therefore it is not possible for any other passion of the soul to be universally the cause of every love. But it may happen that some other passion is the cause of some particular love: just as one good is the cause of another.

 

저는 다음과 같이 답변합니다. 어떠한 종류(some kind)의 사랑을 전제하지(presuppose) 않는 영혼의 다른 정(passion)은 있지 않습니다. 그 이유는 영혼의 각 다른 정은 그 무엇 쪽으로 향하여 움직임(movement) 혹은 그 무엇 안에서 정지(rest) 이들 둘 중의 하나를 의미하기 때문입니다. 그런데 그 무엇 쪽으로 향하는 각 움직임 혹은 그 무엇 안에서 정지는 바로 그 사물 쪽으로 어떠한(some) 동족의 상태/유사(類似)(kinship) 혹은 적절의 상태(aptness)로부터 일어나며, 그리하여 바로 이것이 사랑의 주된 부분을 구성합니다. 그러므로 영혼의 어느 다른 정(passion)이 보편적으로(universally) 각 사랑의 원인이 되는 것은 가능하지 않습니다. 그러나 어떠한 다른 정이, 하나의 선이 다른 선의 원인인 것과 꼭 마찬가지로, 어떠한 개별 사랑의 원인이 되는 것은 가능할 수도 있습니다. 

 

Reply to Objection 1. When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.

 

Reply to Objection 2. Desire for a thing always presupposes love for that thing. But desire of one thing can be the cause of another thing's being loved; thus he that desires money, for this reason loves him from whom he receives it.

 

Reply to Objection 3. Hope causesincreases love; both by reason of pleasure, because it causes pleasure;by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved.